The vulnerability involves ARIA‑GCM cipher suites in wolfSSL for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 that reuse the same 12‑byte GCM nonce for every application‑data record. Because the encryption routine is stateless and the IV supplied by the caller is not incremented, the same nonce is used repeatedly in non‑FIPS builds that utilize the optional MagicCrypto SDK. This nonce reuse undermines the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of GCM and can allow an attacker who observes multiple encrypted records to recover the key or forge messages.

Vendors: wolfSSL. Products: wolfSSL library configured with the ARIA cipher suite and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK, typically used for Korean regulatory deployments. The problem exists in builds where the --enable-aria flag is set and the non‑default SDK is employed. No specific version numbers are provided.

The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6, indicating medium severity. No EPSS score is available and it is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting that no public exploit has been reported yet. Attackers would need visibility into TLS traffic using the affected cipher suite; the likely vector is a network‑level attacker who can observe or inject records. The risk is therefore moderate, but the compromise of encryption parameters could lead to significant data exposure if exploited.