CVE-2026-55563

Feast: `pull_request_target` integration tests run untrusted fork code with production cloud secrets; the `ok-to-test` label guard is bypassable via label persistence on `synchronize`

Published Sep 21, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.9 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Feast is the open source feature store for AI and machine learning. Prior to 0.65.0, .github/workflows/pr_integration_tests.yml uses pull_request_target with the synchronize event and preserves ok-to-test, approved, or lgtm labels across newly pushed commits, allowing a fork contributor to obtain approval for a benign revision and then run changed code from refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge through privileged make targets. The job exposes GCP, AWS, and Snowflake credentials to that code, enabling runner code execution, credential disclosure, and possible access to downstream cloud resources. An external label-removal integration could mitigate the condition, but no repository workflow provided that protection. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Feast’s pre‑0.65.0 release contained a workflow that used the pull_request_target GitHub Actions runner to execute integration tests against the merge commit of pull requests. Because the workflow persisted approval labels such as ok‑to‑test through newly pushed commits, a forked contributor could first have a benign revision approved, then push a malicious revision that would run with the same privileged runner. The workflow exposed cloud secrets for GCP, AWS, and Snowflake, enabling the untrusted code to obtain and misuse those credentials. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the GitHub Actions runner and to gain access to downstream cloud resources.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the open‑source Feast feature store, specifically all releases prior to v0.65.0 of the Feast repository. Users running versions such as 0.64.x or earlier are affected; the fix was implemented in the 0.65.0 release.

Risk and Exploitability

The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 8.9, indicating high severity. The EPSS score is not available, and it is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, but the attack scenario relies on a normal GitHub pull‑request workflow that an external contributor can trigger. Because the untrusted code runs with the permissions of the workflow and with production credentials, the risk of credential disclosure and downstream Cloud access is significant. The likely attack vector involves a forked contributor first obtaining an ok‑to‑test or approved label, then pushing a malicious change that executes under the privileged pull_request_target runner and exploits the exposed secrets.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Feast repository to v0.65.0 or later, where the pull_request_target workflow is removed and the issue is fixed.
  • Replace or remove the pre‑0.65.0 pull_request_target workflow from .github/workflows/pr_integration_tests.yml and, if an alternative is required, use a pull_request event instead of pull_request_target so the merge commit is not automatically executed with production secrets.
  • Introduce a label‑removal or approval‑revocation step in the PR workflow to clear ok‑to‑test, approved, or lgtm labels whenever new commits are pushed, preventing approval persistence across malicious revisions.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 21, 2026 at 17:23 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Feast-dev
Feast-dev feast
Vendors & Products Feast-dev
Feast-dev feast
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Feast is the open source feature store for AI and machine learning. Prior to 0.65.0, .github/workflows/pr_integration_tests.yml uses pull_request_target with the synchronize event and preserves ok-to-test, approved, or lgtm labels across newly pushed commits, allowing a fork contributor to obtain approval for a benign revision and then run changed code from refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge through privileged make targets. The job exposes GCP, AWS, and Snowflake credentials to that code, enabling runner code execution, credential disclosure, and possible access to downstream cloud resources. An external label-removal integration could mitigate the condition, but no repository workflow provided that protection. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
Title Feast: `pull_request_target` integration tests run untrusted fork code with production cloud secrets; the `ok-to-test` label guard is bypassable via label persistence on `synchronize`
Weaknesses CWE-863
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Sep 21, 2026, 5:58 PM
Reserved
Jun 16, 2026, 11:11 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Sep 21, 2026, 4:17 PM
Modified
Sep 24, 2026, 9:16 PM