CVE-2026-55962

TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication: server accepts Finished without client Certificate/CertificateVerify

Published Jun 25, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

A TLS 1.3 server using wolfSSL can accept the client’s Finished message even when the client has not provided a Certificate or CertificateVerify after a post‑handshake CertificateRequest. This bypasses the intended authentication step, allowing an unauthenticated client to proceed through the handshake and potentially gain unauthorized access to protected services, thereby exposing the confidentiality and integrity of the session. The weakness is a CWE‑287 authentication failure.

Affected Systems

The flaw impacts wolfSSL servers that are compiled with post‑handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH or the enable‑all option) and that request a client certificate after the initial handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients and servers that do not use post‑handshake authentication are unaffected. No specific product version is listed, so all builds that enable the feature may be vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 6 indicates moderate risk, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. The EPSS score is <1%, indicating a very low likelihood of exploitation. Based on the description, the likely attack vector is a client that initiates a TLS 1.3 session with a vulnerable server and requests a post‑handshake certificate. The attacker can then trigger the flaw by sending a Finished message without authenticating, as the server incorrectly accepts it. Because the flaw does not require special privileges, a remote attacker can exploit it simply by connecting to the server and requesting a post‑handshake certificate. The vulnerability is mitigated in newer versions of wolfSSL where the Finished validation is scoped to the initial handshake only.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade wolfSSL to a version that includes the post‑handshake authentication check improvement
  • Recompile the server with post‑handshake authentication disabled (remove the WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH compile flag) or avoid requesting post‑handshake certificates if they are not required
  • Review application logic to ensure wolfSSL_request_certificate() is called only when a client certificate is truly needed; disable or remove unnecessary post‑handshake CertificateRequests

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 13, 2026 at 14:09 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4683-1 wolfssl security update
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Vendors & Products Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.
Title TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication: server accepts Finished without client Certificate/CertificateVerify
Weaknesses CWE-287
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
wolfSSL
Published
Updated
Jun 26, 2026, 10:31 AM
Reserved
Jun 17, 2026, 10:10 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jun 25, 2026, 10:17 PM
Modified
Jun 27, 2026, 7:57 PM