CVE-2026-56820

Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks

Published Jul 21, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.4 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Netty versions prior to 4.1.135.Final, and 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final, contain an OCSP client that does not verify that the CertificateID returned in an OCSP response matches the one requested. An attacker can replay a signed OCSP response for a different certificate issued by the same CA, causing the client to accept the response as a GOOD status for the target certificate. This allows the attacker to bypass revocation checks and is identified as CWE-295, Input Validation Failure. Based on the description, it is inferred that the attacker must capture or forge OCSP traffic, implying network-based interaction to supply the malformed response.

Affected Systems

Netty, the Java network application framework, is affected. Vulnerable releases include Netty 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.134.Final and Netty 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final. The issue is fixed in Netty 4.1.136.Final and Netty 4.2.16.Final.

Risk and Exploitability

The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 7.4, indicating high severity. The EPSS score is 0.00182, which is less than 1%. The CVE is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires an attacker to supply a forged OCSP response to a client that trusts the CA issuing the certificate, which can be achieved over the network by controlling the OCSP responder or intercepting OCSP traffic. The attack vector is therefore network-based and likely remote. Based on the description, the attacker must supply a forged response, implying remote network interaction.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Netty to 4.1.136.Final or 4.2.16.Final or newer to receive the restored CertificateID validation.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure your application to perform stricter OCSP checks by validating the response’s CertificateID against the requested certificate yourself, rather than relying on Netty’s default logic.
  • As a temporary safeguard, restrict outbound OCSP traffic to only trusted responder endpoints (e.g., your own CA’s responder IPs) and monitor for unexpected OCSP traffic patterns.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 4, 2026 at 15:50 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Netty
Netty netty
Vendors & Products Netty
Netty netty
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
Title Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks
Weaknesses CWE-295
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.4, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-295

    Improper Certificate Validation

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Jul 24, 2026, 8:12 PM
Reserved
Jun 23, 2026, 2:55 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jul 21, 2026, 11:17 PM
Modified
Jul 30, 2026, 2:48 PM
Severity
Important
Public date
Jul 21, 2026, 10:26 PM