Description
Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.
Published: 2026-08-12
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 18:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Apache
Apache airflow
Vendors & Products Apache
Apache airflow

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 16:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.
Title Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server
Weaknesses CWE-502
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: apache

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-12T16:25:52.119Z

Reserved: 2026-06-28T15:16:00.339Z

Link: CVE-2026-58076

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-12T16:17:08.317

Modified: 2026-08-12T16:17:08.317

Link: CVE-2026-58076

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-12T18:00:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-502

    Deserialization of Untrusted Data