CVE-2026-58108

Personal access token delete filters on Session columns while deleting from PersonalAccessTokenDB

Published Aug 26, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 1.2 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
The personal access token removal query selects from PersonalAccessTokenDB but filters on columns of Session, with no join between them. SQLAlchemy resolves that as an implicit cross join, so the filter does not constrain the delete to the calling user's own token in the way the code reads as intending. This way a user can delete all personal access tokens in the system.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability arises because a delete query intended to target only the calling user's token instead performs an implicit cross join and applies filters on unrelated session columns. This allows an attacker to delete every personal access token stored in the database, thereby removing all established authentication mechanisms for all users. The weakness is an authorization bypass that can lead to denial of service for everyone relying on these tokens.

Affected Systems

The flaw affects Ericsson’s CodeChecker system. No specific version information is supplied, so any deployment of CodeChecker that includes the vulnerable delete operation is potentially impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 1.2 indicates a low severity, and because the EPSS score is not available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog, the risk of widespread exploitation is currently considered low. However, the attack vector is inferred to be user-initiated: any authenticated user can trigger the deletion logic, typically via a UI or API endpoint that accepts token removal requests. Given the clear authorization gap, an attacker with regular user access can execute the flaw without additional permissions, leading to a complete wipe of personal tokens.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update CodeChecker to the latest release that includes a fix for the cross‑join delete issue
  • Ensure that token deletion endpoints are restricted to privileged users only, so that only administrators can perform bulk deletes
  • Regenerate personal access tokens for all users to restore a clean token repository after any accidental deletions
  • Monitor audit logs for unusual token deletion activity to detect potential misuse

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 08:21 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Ericsson
Ericsson codechecker
Vendors & Products Ericsson
Ericsson codechecker
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The personal access token removal query selects from PersonalAccessTokenDB but filters on columns of Session, with no join between them. SQLAlchemy resolves that as an implicit cross join, so the filter does not constrain the delete to the calling user's own token in the way the code reads as intending. This way a user can delete all personal access tokens in the system.
Title Personal access token delete filters on Session columns while deleting from PersonalAccessTokenDB
Weaknesses CWE-284
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 1.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:L'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
ERIC
Published
Updated
Aug 26, 2026, 1:59 PM
Reserved
Jun 29, 2026, 10:41 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 26, 2026, 7:16 AM
Modified
Sep 1, 2026, 9:07 PM