Gitea exposes a server‑side request forgery flaw when restoring a repository from a pull request that contains an unsanitized pull_request.yml file. The malicious user can set the Head.CloneURL field to any network address, causing the Gitea server to make an outbound HTTP request. This allows an attacker to read or exfiltrate internal network resources, discover services, or potentially target vulnerable services for further compromise. The weakness is a classic CWE‑918 scenario where unsanitized input leads to arbitrary outbound connections.

The vulnerability impacts the Gitea open source Git server, specifically the restore‑repo functionality that processes pull request metadata. Systems running any unpatched version of Gitea that accepts pull requests are susceptible; the fix is included in the 1.27.0 release.

No CVSS or EPSS score is published, but the absence of a KEV listing indicates it has not yet been observed in widespread exploitation. The attack vector is inferred to be via the repository restoration API; an attacker with permission to push a pull request can insert a malicious pull_request.yml file. Because the server initiates the outbound request, successful exploitation may expose internal network resources or enable further attacks against services reachable from the Gitea host.