PKCS#12 MAC verification in wolfSSL uses a comparison length supplied by the attacker, without first confirming that the length matches the expected digest size of the configured algorithm. When the MAC stored in the PKCS#12 structure is truncated or zero‑length, the check will still succeed and the tool will accept the data as authentic, thereby defeating the integrity protection normally provided by the MAC.

wolfSSL libraries that implement PKCS#12 MAC verification. No specific versions are listed, so all releases that use the affected verification path are potentially impacted.

The CVSS score is 6, indicating medium severity. EPSS is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The attack vector is not explicitly stated in the advisory, but the flaw suggests that any entity capable of providing a forged or truncated PKCS#12 file could bypass integrity checks. The omission of a proper length check could allow an attacker to inject malicious content that is believed to be authentic, which may compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems that rely on these containers.