CVE-2026-6329

PKCS#12 MAC verification uses attacker-controlled comparison length

Published Jun 25, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

PKCS#12 MAC verification in wolfSSL uses a comparison length supplied by the attacker, without first confirming that the length matches the expected digest size of the configured algorithm. When the MAC stored in the PKCS#12 structure is truncated or zero‑length, the check will still succeed and the tool will accept the data as authentic, thereby defeating the integrity protection normally provided by the MAC.

Affected Systems

wolfSSL libraries that implement PKCS#12 MAC verification. No specific versions are listed, so all releases that use the affected verification path are potentially impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 6, indicating medium severity. EPSS is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The attack vector is not explicitly stated in the advisory, but the flaw suggests that any entity capable of providing a forged or truncated PKCS#12 file could bypass integrity checks. The omission of a proper length check could allow an attacker to inject malicious content that is believed to be authentic, which may compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems that rely on these containers.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade wolfSSL to a version that contains the fix from pull request 10192.
  • Rebuild and redeploy all applications that link against wolfSSL to ensure the new logic is in effect.
  • If an immediate upgrade is not possible, disable or refrain from using PKCS#12 functionality until a patch is available, and perform manual MAC length validation before accepting such files.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on June 25, 2026 at 22:24 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4683-1 wolfssl security update
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Vendors & Products Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.
Title PKCS#12 MAC verification uses attacker-controlled comparison length
Weaknesses CWE-347
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-347

    Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
wolfSSL
Published
Updated
Jun 26, 2026, 10:22 AM
Reserved
Apr 15, 2026, 3:08 AM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jun 25, 2026, 10:17 PM
Modified
Jun 27, 2026, 7:51 PM