9Router versions prior to 0.4.72 contain a server‑side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in the /v1/web/fetch endpoint. The endpoint accepts a URL parameter supplied by the user, passes that URL to an external scraping provider (Firecrawl, Jina Reader, Tavily, or Exa), and returns the fetched content. The only validation performed is a syntactic check using the JavaScript URL constructor, with no blocklist for private IP ranges, IPv4 link‑local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints. Because the server trusts the provided URL, an authenticated or locally‑connected user can instruct the server to fetch arbitrary internal URLs, read internal host responses, and in certain environments retrieve cloud metadata credentials. This read‑access SSRF can also bypass authentication on localhost services and access internal infrastructure that should remain hidden.

Both the decolua 9Router community and other users running the open‑source 9Router application are at risk. An affected product is the decolua:9router project. All releases earlier than v0.4.72 are vulnerable; the fix is incorporated in the 0.4.72 release and later. No other vendors or versions are explicitly listed in the CNA data.

The CVSS score of 8.3 indicates a high severity potential for this flaw. The EPSS score is less than 1%, suggesting that exploitation probability is currently very low, and the vulnerability has not yet been documented in the CISA KEV catalog. Nevertheless, the vulnerability can be exploited by any user who can access the /v1/web/fetch endpoint; an attacker only needs to supply a crafted url query parameter that points to an internal resource. Once triggered, the response content is returned to the requester, allowing the attacker to read hidden data, obtain cloud credentials, or reach internal services from outside the protected network.