Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5

raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header
fits within the message length:

iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;

if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
/* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */
}

It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the
"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the
crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to
__ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read
iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in
particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4
and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)
result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to
SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.

An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:
"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in
32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header
is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a
packet into its own output path.

Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing
"iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally
constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same
basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.

Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around
the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the
patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it.

Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket
message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message
buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain
the self-reported iph->ihl.

Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with
CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net
namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH
crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing
route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state
and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the
trigger uses a real netdev.

Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with
memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a
rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock
distro kernel.
Published: 2026-07-19
Score: 7.8 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

A crafted IPv4 packet with an Internet Header Length of less than five can be injected via a raw socket that uses the IP_HDRINCL option in the Linux kernel. The kernel's validation incorrectly permits such packets and forwards them into the IP output path where downstream code, such as the authentication header module, assumes a sane IHL and performs an out‑of‑bounds memory copy. This out‑of‑bounds write is a classic example of CWE‑805: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value. The resulting kernel panic brings the host down, causing a complete denial of service.

Affected Systems

All Linux kernel implementations that have not yet incorporated the commit that adds a check for IHL values less than five are affected. This includes kernel releases across both Linux distributions listed in the CNA data prior to the application of the identified patch. No specific version numbers are provided, so all kernels lacking the mitigation should be considered vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 7.8 and an EPSS score of less than 1 %, and it is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. Exploitation requires a process with CAP_NET_RAW capability; in user and network namespaces an attacker may use CAP_NET_ADMIN to install the necessary raw‑socket permissions. An attacker who can craft a packet with IHL = 4 can trigger a local kernel crash. While the attack vector is relatively narrow and the probability of exploitation is low, the impact—a full kernel crash—renders the vulnerability a severe denial‑of‑service vector.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 4, 2026 at 18:01 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update the Linux kernel to a version that includes the fix for IHL < 5 in raw_send_hdrinc().
  • Restrict CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges to trusted processes in user and network namespaces, preventing untrusted code from creating raw packets with IP_HDRINCL.
  • Avoid using raw sockets with IP_HDRINCL for non‑trusted traffic; where possible, remove or disable raw socket support or enforce strict header validation at the application level.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 4, 2026 at 18:01 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8575-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8576-1 Linux kernel (NVIDIA Tegra) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8593-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8575-2 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8576-2 Linux kernel (NVIDIA Tegra) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8575-3 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8603-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8610-1 Linux kernel (Azure CVM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8618-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8620-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8620-2 Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8620-3 Linux kernel (Intel IoTG) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8620-4 Linux kernel (Intel IoTG) vulnerabilities
History

Sun, 26 Jul 2026 08:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20

Tue, 21 Jul 2026 22:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20

Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-805
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate


Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Sun, 19 Jul 2026 16:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel.
Title ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-05T12:39:23.263Z

Reserved: 2026-07-19T07:54:57.035Z

Link: CVE-2026-64114

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-07-19T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-64114 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-04T18:15:03Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-805

    Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value