Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY
commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a
permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to
fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other
functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of
the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls
set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check.
set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it
rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via
set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and
rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr().
Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler
smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA /
FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm —
which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate.
A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no
FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType
SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself
access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this
is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop —
the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate.
Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so
require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the
file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info().
ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY
commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a
permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to
fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other
functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of
the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls
set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check.
set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it
rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via
set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and
rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr().
Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler
smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA /
FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm —
which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate.
A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no
FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType
SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself
access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this
is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop —
the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate.
Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so
require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the
file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info().
Published:
2026-07-25
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
References
History
Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check. set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(). Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA / FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm — which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate. A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop — the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate. Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info(). | |
| Title | ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-25T08:50:39.797Z
Reserved: 2026-07-19T15:36:31.785Z
Link: CVE-2026-64394
No data.
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.