Apache Airflow’s Config API failed to mask team‑scoped sensitive configuration values in multi‑team deployments. An authenticated Viewer with only configuration‑read permission, if the Config API is exposed, could read a Celery broker URL that includes embedded credentials in cleartext, while the global setting was correctly masked. This denial of proper masking is a classic information‑disclosure flaw (CWE‑200) and is distinct from the prior CVEs that addressed global secrets, meaning deployments that upgraded to apache‑airflow 3.3.0 still remain vulnerable.

The affected product is Apache Airflow from the Apache Software Foundation. Any deployment that has multi‑team mode enabled and the Config API exposed is impacted, specifically Apache Airflow 3.3.0 and earlier versions. The flaw is resolved by upgrading to apache‑airflow 3.3.1 or later, which normalizes team‑scoped sections before applying masking.

The risk is that an attacker who can authenticate as a Viewer can retrieve full Celery broker credentials, enabling impersonation, task hijacking, or network reconnaissance against backend services. The likely attack vector requires access to the Airflow UI or API, exposure of the Config API, and a user with read‑only config permissions, all of which are typically available to internal staff. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.5, an EPSS score of < 1%, and is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. This score indicates a medium‑to‑high severity, and the low effort required to read the configuration makes it attractive to potential attackers.