CVE-2026-68496

jackson-dataformats-binary: Smile parser does not enforce StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength, enabling memory-exhaustion denial of service

Published Oct 1, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson‑dataformats‑binary does not invoke the StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() check when decoding JSON object property names. As a result, an attacker can craft a single property name of unbounded length and cause the parser to allocate and buffer the entire name before any limit is applied. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings. The only practical restrictions are the amount of data the attacker can supply and the JVM heap size, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service with no additional privileges required.

Affected Systems

All releases of FasterXML jackson‑dataformats‑binary that have not been updated to one of the fixed builds are affected. Specifically, older versions in the 2.18.x, 2.21.x, 2.22.x, 3.1.x and 3.2.x lines are vulnerable; the 2.16.x, 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x, and 3.0.x branches received no fix and are no longer maintained upstream. Upgrading to com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson‑dataformat‑smile 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, or tools.jackson.dataformat:jackson‑dataformat‑smile 3.1.6 or 3.2.2 removes the exploit.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 7.5, indicating a moderate-to-high risk. EPSS information is not available and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, so no current evidence of widespread exploitation exists. Attackers only need the ability to send Smile‑formatted data to the parser – this could be over a network endpoint, a file upload, or any other interface that deserializes incoming data. The attack path requires no elevated privileges and exploits a resource exhaustion flaw (CWE‑400/770); successful exploitation would result in an application or service becoming unresponsive, potentially impacting availability for all users of that service.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-smile 2.18.10, 2.21.6 or 2.22.2, or to tools.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-smile 3.1.6 or 3.2.2. The 2.16.x, 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x and 3.0.x lines received no fix on their own branch and are no longer maintained upstream.


Vendor Workaround

No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxNameLength is the control that is not enforced, and maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1). Bound request body size ahead of the parser, set StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength explicitly on the SmileFactory, and cap JVM heap so a single document cannot exhaust process memory. Avoid parsing untrusted Smile input where these limits cannot be applied.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade FasterXML jackson‑dataformats‑binary to one of the fixed releases: com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson‑dataformat‑smile 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, or tools.jackson.dataformat:jackson‑dataformat‑smile 3.1.6 or 3.2.2.
  • If an upgrade is not feasible immediately, block or limit the size of traffic sent to the parser: set StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength explicitly on the SmileFactory, enforce an upload size ceiling at the application layer, and restrict the JVM heap so a single document cannot exceed available memory.
  • Avoid parsing untrusted Smile data when these limits cannot be applied; consider disabling binary format parsing on public endpoints or implementing a whitelist of accepted data sources.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 1, 2026 at 18:51 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Fasterxml
Fasterxml jackson-dataformats-binary
Vendors & Products Fasterxml
Fasterxml jackson-dataformats-binary
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.
Title jackson-dataformats-binary: Smile parser does not enforce StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength, enabling memory-exhaustion denial of service
Weaknesses CWE-400
CWE-770
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-400

    Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

  • CWE-770

    Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
HeroDevs
Published
Updated
Oct 1, 2026, 6:15 PM
Reserved
Jul 30, 2026, 3:20 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Oct 1, 2026, 6:17 PM
Modified
Oct 2, 2026, 6:44 PM