Description
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. The defect is in the parse gate rather than in any one classifier, so every consumer of Address4 inherits it: isPrivate(), isLoopback(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isInSubnet(), isHostInSubnet(), and correctForm() are all computed from the mis-decoded octets. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.1.
Published: 2026-08-03
Score: 7.7 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

No analysis available yet.

Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
History

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 21:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Beaugunderson
Beaugunderson ip-address
Vendors & Products Beaugunderson
Beaugunderson ip-address

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 20:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. The defect is in the parse gate rather than in any one classifier, so every consumer of Address4 inherits it: isPrivate(), isLoopback(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isInSubnet(), isHostInSubnet(), and correctForm() are all computed from the mis-decoded octets. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.1.
Title ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
Weaknesses CWE-20
CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N'}

Subscriptions

Beaugunderson Ip-address
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-03T19:56:13.640Z

Reserved: 2026-08-03T16:00:23.483Z

Link: CVE-2026-69192

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-03T21:30:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation

  • CWE-918

    Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)