Red Hat CNA-LR concluded that this CVE is not valid.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
OpenCVE Recommended Actions
- Upgrade to the newest Mautic release that removes the unvalidated field handling.
- If an upgrade cannot be performed immediately, limit access to the vulnerable AJAX endpoint so that only authorized administrators can call it, or completely disable the action for non‑privileged users.
- Implement server‑side validation to ensure that the "field" parameter matches an allowed column name before it is used in the query string.
Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 10, 2026 at 22:58 UTC.
Tracking
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No advisories yet.
No reference.
Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Mautic - SQL Injection via field Parameter in Lead-by-Field-Value AJAX Endpoint | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-89 | |
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ( = 'l.'.) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. | Red Hat CNA-LR concluded that this CVE is not valid. |
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks. | Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ( = 'l.'.) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. |
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 11:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Mautic: SQL Injection via field Parameter in Lead-by-Field-Value AJAX Endpoint | Mautic - SQL Injection via field Parameter in Lead-by-Field-Value AJAX Endpoint |
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 12:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Mautic
Mautic mautic |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Mautic
Mautic mautic |
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 11:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks. | |
| Title | Mautic: SQL Injection via field Parameter in Lead-by-Field-Value AJAX Endpoint | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-89 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: REJECTED
Assigner: TuranSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-17T13:59:29.024Z
Reserved: 2026-08-05T10:53:53.176Z
Link: CVE-2026-71245
Updated:
Status : Rejected
Published: 2026-08-05T11:16:27.487
Modified: 2026-08-17T14:20:21.933
Link: CVE-2026-71245
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-10T23:00:07Z
No weakness.