CVE-2026-71247

Documenso - Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents

Published Aug 5, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

A flaw in Documenso's sign‑field‑with‑token endpoint permits a recipient holding an Assistant role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not‑yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, without restriction on field type. The handler creates a Signature record for the target field without verifying that the field type is a signature or that the acting recipient owns the target. In a sequential‑signing workflow, an assistant can therefore forge another signer's signature field, producing a legally binding but unauthorized completion of the document. The newer V2 signing path explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's test suite confirms this guard is absent from the V1 path used here.

Affected Systems

This vulnerability affects the Documenso application, specifically versions that employ the V1 signing path sign‑field‑with‑token.ts. Any deployment that does not use the newer V2 signing logic sign‑envelope‑field.ts, which blocks assistants from signing signature fields, is potentially impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 6.5 indicates a moderate severity, while the EPSS score is 0.00174% and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires an attacker to have an Assistant role within the same envelope, typically via the web interface that accepts token‑based field submissions. Forging a signature undermines the integrity of contractual documents and can expose the organization to legal fraud and compliance violations.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to the latest Documenso release that incorporates the V2 signing path, which prevents assistants from signing signature fields.
  • Revoke the Assistant role from any recipients engaged in sequential‑signing documents until the vulnerability is patched or mitigated.
  • Audit existing documents for potential forged signatures and, if necessary, re‑initiate the signing process to ensure authenticity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 10, 2026 at 21:49 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
References
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field. Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here.
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents Documenso - Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Documenso
Documenso documenso
Vendors & Products Documenso
Documenso documenso
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field.
Title Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents
Weaknesses CWE-863
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
TuranSec
Published
Updated
Aug 10, 2026, 11:46 AM
Reserved
Aug 5, 2026, 10:53 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 5, 2026, 11:16 AM
Modified
Aug 26, 2026, 5:13 PM