CVE-2026-71250

Firefly III - Webhook URL Validation Explicitly Allows Loopback and Is Bypassable via DNS Rebinding

Published Aug 5, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Firefly III’s webhook URL validator contains an early‑return that allows any resolved address in the 127.0.0.0/8 block to pass validation. An authenticated user with webhook capability enabled, which is disabled by default, can therefore set up a webhook that targets services on the server’s loopback interface. Because the validator accepts the hostname during validation but the outbound request is made later, the attacker is able to reach internal loopback resources. No user‑visible response is returned from the webhook call, limiting immediate disclosure but still allowing internal network exploration.

Affected Systems

The affected product is Firefly III, as identified by the CNA firefly‑iii. No specific affected version numbers are listed. Users of any version where the webhook feature is available and enabled may be impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score for this flaw is 4.3, indicating moderate potential impact. The EPSS score is less than 1%, showing a very low but non‑zero probability of exploitation, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. Attackers need to be authenticated to configure a webhook, but once the webhook is set up, they can direct requests to internal addresses, including loopback resources. The blind nature limits immediate disclosure of data, but the ability to reach internal services could facilitate further exploitation.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply the latest security update from Firefly III when it becomes available
  • Disable or revoke webhook functionality until a patch is released
  • Restrict outbound network traffic from Firefly III to known trusted hosts or block access to 127.0.0.0/8 and other private IP ranges
  • Enable logging and monitor webhook activity for unusual destinations

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 10, 2026 at 22:18 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
References
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server. Additionally, the validator resolves the target hostname once via gethostbyname() at validation time, but the actual outbound request (StandardWebhookSender.php, via Guzzle) re-resolves the hostname independently at send time, allowing a DNS-rebinding attacker to pass validation against a public IP and have the real request delivered to a private or internal address. The webhook response body is only written to a server-side debug log, not returned to the triggering user, so this is a blind SSRF primitive rather than one with direct response read-back. Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server.
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Firefly III: Webhook URL Validation Explicitly Allows Loopback and Is Bypassable via DNS Rebinding Firefly III - Webhook URL Validation Explicitly Allows Loopback and Is Bypassable via DNS Rebinding
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Firefly-iii
Firefly-iii firefly Iii
Vendors & Products Firefly-iii
Firefly-iii firefly Iii
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server. Additionally, the validator resolves the target hostname once via gethostbyname() at validation time, but the actual outbound request (StandardWebhookSender.php, via Guzzle) re-resolves the hostname independently at send time, allowing a DNS-rebinding attacker to pass validation against a public IP and have the real request delivered to a private or internal address. The webhook response body is only written to a server-side debug log, not returned to the triggering user, so this is a blind SSRF primitive rather than one with direct response read-back.
Title Firefly III: Webhook URL Validation Explicitly Allows Loopback and Is Bypassable via DNS Rebinding
Weaknesses CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-918

    Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
TuranSec
Published
Updated
Aug 10, 2026, 11:46 AM
Reserved
Aug 5, 2026, 10:53 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 5, 2026, 11:16 AM
Modified
Aug 26, 2026, 5:13 PM