Description
The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. ":8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary.
Published: 2026-08-05
Score: 9.8 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The NASA‑AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System reference implementation’s default docker‑compose configuration exposes the amp‑manager service’s REST API directly to the host network on port 8089 with elevated capabilities such as NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, and SYS_NICE. This bypasses the Configuration and Access Manager gateway, the system’s sole authentication boundary, allowing any client that can reach port 8089 to send command requests without authentication and execute arbitrary command sets against connected DTNMA agents. The vulnerability is classified as CWE‑306, improper authorization, and the impact is full remote command execution that can compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of managed nodes.

Affected Systems

The affected component is the reference implementation of NASA‑AMMOS ANMS. The default docker‑compose configuration exposes the amp‑manager service to the host network on port 8089. No specific product or library versions are listed in the advisory; the issue exists in the shipped reference implementation.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.8 classifies this as a critical vulnerability. The EPSS score of 0.00369 (less than 1%) indicates a very low exploitation probability at present, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, though lack of public exploits does not diminish its severity. Attackers can exploit the exposed REST API from any host that can reach port 8089, bypassing the single authentication boundary that normally protects the system. Because no authentication is required, the attacker can control any registered agent, potentially influencing the operation of ground or spacecraft nodes. The risk is amplified in environments where the amp‑manager service is reachable from the broader network or the Internet, making exploitation more probable under those conditions.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 10, 2026 at 21:20 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply the latest security patch or upgrade to the most recent releases of NASA‑AMMOS ANMS that address the authentication bypass.
  • Modify the docker‑compose.yml file to remove or restrict the host‑level exposure of port 8089, binding the amp‑manager service only to an internal Docker network or protecting it with firewall rules.
  • Enable authentication on the amp‑manager REST API by setting enable_auth_domain_check to "yes" and ensuring that the Configuration and Access Manager gateway is active.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 10, 2026 at 21:20 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 12:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft. The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. ":8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary.
Title NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools - Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 11:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools - Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 10:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Nasa-ammos
Nasa-ammos anms
Vendors & Products Nasa-ammos
Nasa-ammos anms

Wed, 05 Aug 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 05 Aug 2026 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.
Title NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API
Weaknesses CWE-306
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: TuranSec

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-10T11:47:22.029Z

Reserved: 2026-08-05T12:23:34.968Z

Link: CVE-2026-71289

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-05T15:49:21.606Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-08-05T13:24:53.703

Modified: 2026-08-26T17:13:24.800

Link: CVE-2026-71289

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-10T21:30:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-306

    Missing Authentication for Critical Function