Technical impact
Improper validation of server-supplied numeric header values in the Erlang/OTP httpc client allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a Content‑Length or Retry‑After header with a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the Content‑Length value with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, which defaults to no limit, so the conversion can process arbitrarily large numbers. The same issue exists in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content‑Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry‑After, whose only guard is that the first character is a digit. Values up to roughly 1.26 million digits are successfully converted and cause the client to spend hundreds of milliseconds performing arbitrary‑precision arithmetic per response. Because the conversion function accepts integers of any size, input bounding is the caller’s responsibility.
Affected Systems
The issue affects Erlang/OTP releases from OTP 17.0 through OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6. This corresponds to inets component versions 5.10 through 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP versions before 17.0 are affected is unknown.
Risk and Exploitability
Risk is moderate; the vulnerability can be exploited by a controlling or compromised HTTP server that communicates with an Erlang/OTP client. An attacker may send an extremely long numeric header, causing the client to expend significant CPU time converting the value and potentially leading to denial of service for the affected process. The public exploit status is not stated in the provided data. The EPSS score of 0.00577 (<1%) indicates a very low but nonzero potential for exploitation, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The likely attack vector is a remote attacker that serves as an HTTP target to the client, which is inferred from the description that the driver expects server‑supplied headers.