CVE-2026-71562

httpc does not bound server-supplied numeric header values before integer conversion

Published Sep 1, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits.

httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Improper validation of server-supplied numeric header values in the Erlang/OTP httpc client allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a Content‑Length or Retry‑After header with a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the Content‑Length value with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, which defaults to no limit, so the conversion can process arbitrarily large numbers. The same issue exists in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content‑Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry‑After, whose only guard is that the first character is a digit. Values up to roughly 1.26 million digits are successfully converted and cause the client to spend hundreds of milliseconds performing arbitrary‑precision arithmetic per response. Because the conversion function accepts integers of any size, input bounding is the caller’s responsibility.

Affected Systems

The issue affects Erlang/OTP releases from OTP 17.0 through OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6. This corresponds to inets component versions 5.10 through 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP versions before 17.0 are affected is unknown.

Risk and Exploitability

Risk is moderate; the vulnerability can be exploited by a controlling or compromised HTTP server that communicates with an Erlang/OTP client. An attacker may send an extremely long numeric header, causing the client to expend significant CPU time converting the value and potentially leading to denial of service for the affected process. The public exploit status is not stated in the provided data. The EPSS score of 0.00577 (<1%) indicates a very low but nonzero potential for exploitation, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The likely attack vector is a remote attacker that serves as an HTTP target to the client, which is inferred from the description that the driver expects server‑supplied headers.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Erlang/OTP to a release newer than OTP 27.3.4.17 (or OTP 28.5.0.6, or OTP 29.0.6) so that the httpc numeric header conversion is bounded.
  • Configure the httpc client's max_body_size option to a reasonable limit to prevent excessive processing of large headers.
  • If upgrade is not possible, monitor network traffic for unusually large numeric header values and terminate connections that exceed a safe threshold.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 15, 2026 at 11:55 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown. Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Erlang erlang/otp
Erlang otp
Vendors & Products Erlang erlang/otp
Erlang otp
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
Title httpc does not bound server-supplied numeric header values before integer conversion
First Time appeared Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp
Weaknesses CWE-1284
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 6.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-1284

    Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 20, 2026, 6:05 AM
Reserved
Aug 7, 2026, 3:15 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Sep 1, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Nov 20, 2026, 6:17 AM