Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()
Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete()
re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the
current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can
disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/
geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if
the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed.
geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in
NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the
offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case
where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if
it lands past inner_network_offset.
Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner
L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag
(vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves
inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies
inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint
gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header,
i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.
geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()
Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete()
re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the
current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can
disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/
geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if
the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed.
geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in
NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the
offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case
where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if
it lands past inner_network_offset.
Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner
L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag
(vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves
inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies
inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint
gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header,
i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.
Published:
2026-08-15
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
|
|||||||||||||||
| Linux | Linux | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
References
History
Sat, 15 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete() Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete() re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/ geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed. geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if it lands past inner_network_offset. Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag (vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header, i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected. | |
| Title | geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-15T05:56:30.847Z
Reserved: 2026-08-09T03:40:39.926Z
Link: CVE-2026-72407
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-15T06:22:14.300
Modified: 2026-08-15T06:22:14.300
Link: CVE-2026-72407
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.