Description
blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names and values, including X-Forwarded-For and internal authorization headers, that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. Any http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers, including X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-Host, is affected. If a fronting proxy strips or normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists, rate limits, or auditing, forge the https scheme, or inject internal authorization headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
Published: 2026-08-12
Score: 7.4 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr blaze: Chunked-body trailer fields promoted into Request.headers in blaze-server (front-end header-sanitization bypass)
History

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names and values, including X-Forwarded-For and internal authorization headers, that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. Any http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers, including X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-Host, is affected. If a fronting proxy strips or normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists, rate limits, or auditing, forge the https scheme, or inject internal authorization headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
Title blaze: Chunked-body trailer fields promoted into Request.headers in blaze-server (front-end header-sanitization bypass)
Weaknesses CWE-444
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.4, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}


Subscriptions

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-12T21:11:55.180Z

Reserved: 2026-08-12T19:00:33.735Z

Link: CVE-2026-73495

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-12T22:17:16.820

Modified: 2026-08-12T22:17:16.820

Link: CVE-2026-73495

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

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Weaknesses
  • CWE-444

    Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')