Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers
Another challenge with unlocked filters.
There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found
and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request
and cause a race.
Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a
u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio:
1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both
drop filter_chain_lock
2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain
3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp
already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new
and returns u32_tp to the caller.
Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind
"flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path
which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already
gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty
options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the
last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero.
At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took
rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following
(illustrated by the PoC):
[ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
[ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524
Call Trace:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Allocated by task 526:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Freed by task 522:
kfree
u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662)
tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446)
tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459)
Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around
tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held.
To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a
semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here
for future cleanup if deemed necessary):
The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are
redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine
classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the
rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy()
and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic,
fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy()
(u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter.
A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback
signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether
they are running in an unlocked context.
net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers
Another challenge with unlocked filters.
There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found
and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request
and cause a race.
Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a
u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio:
1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both
drop filter_chain_lock
2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain
3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp
already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new
and returns u32_tp to the caller.
Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind
"flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path
which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already
gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty
options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the
last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero.
At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took
rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following
(illustrated by the PoC):
[ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
[ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524
Call Trace:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Allocated by task 526:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Freed by task 522:
kfree
u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662)
tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446)
tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459)
Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around
tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held.
To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a
semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here
for future cleanup if deemed necessary):
The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are
redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine
classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the
rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy()
and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic,
fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy()
(u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter.
A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback
signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether
they are running in an unlocked context.
Published:
2026-08-22
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Linux | Linux | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Sat, 22 Aug 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers Another challenge with unlocked filters. There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request and cause a race. Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio: 1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both drop filter_chain_lock 2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain 3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new and returns u32_tp to the caller. Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind "flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero. At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following (illustrated by the PoC): [ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) [ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524 Call Trace: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Allocated by task 526: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Freed by task 522: kfree u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662) tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446) tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459) Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held. To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here for future cleanup if deemed necessary): The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy() and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic, fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy() (u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter. A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether they are running in an unlocked context. | |
| Title | net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-22T15:33:00.933Z
Reserved: 2026-08-15T05:44:03.927Z
Link: CVE-2026-74700
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-22T16:16:44.610
Modified: 2026-08-22T16:16:44.610
Link: CVE-2026-74700
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.