Description
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In version 4.39, the filer's TUS resumable-upload handler checks JWT allowed_prefixes scoping only when a session is created, letting a low-privilege tenant hijack another tenant's upload session to write content to filer paths their own token forbids. The HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE verbs that act on an existing session by its id never verify that the session's stored target path falls within the caller's allowed prefixes, so a tenant who obtains another upload's session identifier can PATCH attacker bytes into it and, on completion, have the file land at the victim's out-of-scope path. The same token can also DELETE other tenants' sessions and HEAD them to read upload progress and size, defeating the JWT prefix isolation. This vulnerability only affects deployments that configure filer JWT signing and have TUS uploads enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
Published: 2026-08-26
Score: 7.6 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability allows an authenticated low‑privilege user to hijack another tenant’s TUS upload session and write data to a filer path outside their allowed prefixes, effectively bypassing the JWT‑based scoping. This unauthorized write can corrupt or replace files owned by other tenants, compromising data integrity and potentially leading to information disclosure if malicious content is inserted. The weakness is an Authorization Bypass through Privilege Escalation (CWE‑639).

Affected Systems

SeaweedFS deployments using the filer component with JWT signing enabled and TUS resumable uploads activated are impacted. The issue exists in version 4.39 and earlier; it was addressed in version 4.40. Only installations that have configured the filer to use JWT signing with allowed_prefixes and have the TUS upload feature turned on are susceptible; systems without these settings are not affected.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.6 denotes a high impact vulnerability that is fully authenticated. Although the EPSS score is not available, the lack of public exploitation in the CISA KEV catalog suggests a moderate threat level; however, attackers could leverage credentials they already possess or obtain session identifiers via other vulnerability or social engineering techniques. The attack path requires an authenticated tenant to obtain another tenant’s session ID and then issue PATCH, HEAD, or DELETE requests against it, bypassing the intended prefix restrictions. Given the severity, organizations with exposed SeaweedFS installations should consider the vulnerability high risk until mitigated.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 23:28 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade SeaweedFS to version 4.40 or later, which removes the unchecked scope validation in the TUS handler.
  • If an upgrade is not immediate, disable the TUS resumable‑upload feature or whitelist only privileged users to prevent session hijacking.
  • When possible, restrict JWT signing to a minimal set of allowed_prefixes or remove the prefix check entirely to eliminate cross‑tenant path traversal. After applying any change, review upload session logs for anomalous activity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 23:28 UTC.

Tracking

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History

Thu, 27 Aug 2026 00:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs
Vendors & Products Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 22:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In version 4.39, the filer's TUS resumable-upload handler checks JWT allowed_prefixes scoping only when a session is created, letting a low-privilege tenant hijack another tenant's upload session to write content to filer paths their own token forbids. The HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE verbs that act on an existing session by its id never verify that the session's stored target path falls within the caller's allowed prefixes, so a tenant who obtains another upload's session identifier can PATCH attacker bytes into it and, on completion, have the file land at the victim's out-of-scope path. The same token can also DELETE other tenants' sessions and HEAD them to read upload progress and size, defeating the JWT prefix isolation. This vulnerability only affects deployments that configure filer JWT signing and have TUS uploads enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
Title SeaweedFS: Authenticated Cross-Prefix IDOR in Filer TUS Handler Enables Arbitrary Write to Tenant-Forbidden Paths
Weaknesses CWE-639
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L'}


Subscriptions

Seaweedfs Seaweedfs
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-26T21:07:57.105Z

Reserved: 2026-08-20T19:36:13.804Z

Link: CVE-2026-77368

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-26T22:16:29.860

Modified: 2026-08-26T22:16:29.860

Link: CVE-2026-77368

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-27T00:45:03Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-639

    Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key