docker‑socket‑proxy does not correctly restrict read operations in the /containers Docker API namespace when the CONTAINERS environment variable is present. Attackers can issue GET requests to /containers/{id}/archive, /containers/{id}/export, /containers/{id}/logs, and /containers/{id}/top, allowing them to read arbitrary files and download the entire container filesystem as a tar archive. This flaw results in a clear confidentiality compromise, exposing potentially sensitive data stored within containers.

The vulnerability applies to Tecnativa's docker‑socket‑proxy release 0.5.0 and earlier. Users running this product without the supplied patch are at risk, as the insecure access control remains active in all affected versions.

The CVSS score of 8.3 demonstrates a high severity rating, but the EPSS score is not available, so the current exploitation probability cannot be quantified. The flaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Because the attack requires access to the proxy’s HTTP interface and the CONTAINERS environment variable must be set, the likely attack vector is network‑based against a system that has been exposed to untrusted hosts or that has a misconfigured proxy. Once the attacker reaches the endpoint, they can read any file inside the container’s filesystem, effectively bypassing isolation boundaries.