Description
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow and Vert.x HTTP components.



This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.



The Camel HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it. Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step: it reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction registered on the classpath - including the secret functions - and, through camel-bean, the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to Exchange content therefore turned a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient. Seven call sites were affected: HttpHelper.createURL and HttpHelper.createMethod in camel-http-common, HttpMethodHelper.createMethod in camel-http, VertxHttpHelper.resolveHttpURI in camel-vertx-http, UndertowHelper.createURL and UndertowHelper.createMethod in camel-undertow, and NettyHttpHelper.createURL in camel-netty-http. The bridgeEndpoint option did not bound the exposure: it suppresses the CamelHttpUri override in the createURL family but not in the createMethod family, so a route using the documented bridging configuration still resolved placeholders taken from the header, and CamelRestHttpUri was consumed before any bridgeEndpoint check in all four components. Only camel-http offered an opt-out, skipControlHeaders, which defaults to false. Reaching the headers did not always require header injection, because several Camel HTTP consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line themselves as a documented reverse-proxy feature. An unresolvable placeholder additionally produced a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoed the URI, which distinguishes a set from an unset configuration key even where no outbound request is made. The behaviour predates the 4.x line. This advisory continues the alignment CAMEL-24282 applied to the toD and enrich dynamic-URI EIPs in 4.22.0, extending the same build-time-resolution contract to the HTTP producer components.



Users should upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name.
Published: 2026-10-19
Score: 8.2 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Sensitive information disclosure and potential remote code execution via placeholder injection
Action: Patch Now
AI Analysis

Impact

Apache Camel’s HTTP producer components (camel-http, camel-netty-http, camel-undertow, camel-vertx-http) allow an incoming message to override the target endpoint URI via CamelHttpUri or CamelRestHttpUri headers. The framework then mistakenly applies CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() to the entire string, treating it as a configuration resolution step. That process expands placeholders against operating‑system environment variables, JVM system properties, registered property functions, and even invokes no‑argument bean methods via camel‑bean. As a result, a crafted header can retrieve or expose secrets or trigger arbitrary bean logic, causing sensitive data disclosure and, in the worst case, remote code execution if a bean method performs privileged actions. Additionally, unresolvable placeholders produce a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoes the URI, further leaking sensitive information.

Affected Systems

Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow, and Vert.x HTTP components from version 4.0.0 up to but excluding 4.18.5, and from 4.19.0 up to but excluding 4.22.1 are affected. Versions 4.18.5, 4.22.1 and all subsequent releases (including 4.23.0) contain the fix. Older release lines such as 4.14.x and below are end‑of‑life and will not receive a patch, so deployments must migrate to a supported stream.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.2 indicates a medium‑to‑high severity flaw. While an EPSS score is not provided, the vulnerability can be abused by any actor that can influence an HTTP request to a Camel endpoint. The likely attack vector is a remote network request that supplies a crafted CamelHttpUri or CamelRestHttpUri header. The flaw is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, yet the attack path remains viable because the configuration resolver treats placeholders as configuration keys, exposing secrets and potentially executing unexpected bean logic.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 19, 2026 at 14:05 UTC.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name.


Vendor Workaround

Strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.23.0 (or to 4.22.1 for 4.22.x streams and to 4.18.5 for 4.18.x streams) to apply the vendor fix.
  • If an upgrade is not immediately possible, remove the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers at the trust boundary before the producer is invoked, or enable skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints.
  • Implement a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy for the Camel namespace and avoid exposing placeholder-sensitive data via environment variables or system properties; use a vault for secrets instead of env or properties.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 19, 2026 at 14:05 UTC.

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History

Mon, 19 Oct 2026 16:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Apache
Apache apache Camel
Apache camel
Vendors & Products Apache
Apache apache Camel
Apache camel

Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow and Vert.x HTTP components. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it. Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step: it reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction registered on the classpath - including the AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp, IBM, CyberArk and Kubernetes secret functions - and, through camel-bean, the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to Exchange content therefore turned a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient. Seven call sites were affected: HttpHelper.createURL and HttpHelper.createMethod in camel-http-common, HttpMethodHelper.createMethod in camel-http, VertxHttpHelper.resolveHttpURI in camel-vertx-http, UndertowHelper.createURL and UndertowHelper.createMethod in camel-undertow, and NettyHttpHelper.createURL in camel-netty-http. The bridgeEndpoint option did not bound the exposure: it suppresses the CamelHttpUri override in the createURL family but not in the createMethod family, so a route using the documented bridging configuration still resolved placeholders taken from the header, and CamelRestHttpUri was consumed before any bridgeEndpoint check in all four components. Only camel-http offered an opt-out, skipControlHeaders, which defaults to false. Reaching the headers did not always require header injection, because several Camel HTTP consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line themselves as a documented reverse-proxy feature. An unresolvable placeholder additionally produced a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoed the URI, which distinguishes a set from an unset configuration key even where no outbound request is made. The behaviour predates the 4.x line; it dates back to the camel-http4 and camel-netty4 components. This advisory continues the alignment CAMEL-24282 applied to the toD and enrich dynamic-URI EIPs in 4.22.0, extending the same build-time-resolution contract to the HTTP producer components. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow and Vert.x HTTP components. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it. Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step: it reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction registered on the classpath - including the secret functions - and, through camel-bean, the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to Exchange content therefore turned a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient. Seven call sites were affected: HttpHelper.createURL and HttpHelper.createMethod in camel-http-common, HttpMethodHelper.createMethod in camel-http, VertxHttpHelper.resolveHttpURI in camel-vertx-http, UndertowHelper.createURL and UndertowHelper.createMethod in camel-undertow, and NettyHttpHelper.createURL in camel-netty-http. The bridgeEndpoint option did not bound the exposure: it suppresses the CamelHttpUri override in the createURL family but not in the createMethod family, so a route using the documented bridging configuration still resolved placeholders taken from the header, and CamelRestHttpUri was consumed before any bridgeEndpoint check in all four components. Only camel-http offered an opt-out, skipControlHeaders, which defaults to false. Reaching the headers did not always require header injection, because several Camel HTTP consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line themselves as a documented reverse-proxy feature. An unresolvable placeholder additionally produced a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoed the URI, which distinguishes a set from an unset configuration key even where no outbound request is made. The behaviour predates the 4.x line. This advisory continues the alignment CAMEL-24282 applied to the toD and enrich dynamic-URI EIPs in 4.22.0, extending the same build-time-resolution contract to the HTTP producer components. Users should upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name.

Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow and Vert.x HTTP components. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it. Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step: it reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction registered on the classpath - including the AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp, IBM, CyberArk and Kubernetes secret functions - and, through camel-bean, the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to Exchange content therefore turned a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient. Seven call sites were affected: HttpHelper.createURL and HttpHelper.createMethod in camel-http-common, HttpMethodHelper.createMethod in camel-http, VertxHttpHelper.resolveHttpURI in camel-vertx-http, UndertowHelper.createURL and UndertowHelper.createMethod in camel-undertow, and NettyHttpHelper.createURL in camel-netty-http. The bridgeEndpoint option did not bound the exposure: it suppresses the CamelHttpUri override in the createURL family but not in the createMethod family, so a route using the documented bridging configuration still resolved placeholders taken from the header, and CamelRestHttpUri was consumed before any bridgeEndpoint check in all four components. Only camel-http offered an opt-out, skipControlHeaders, which defaults to false. Reaching the headers did not always require header injection, because several Camel HTTP consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line themselves as a documented reverse-proxy feature. An unresolvable placeholder additionally produced a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoed the URI, which distinguishes a set from an unset configuration key even where no outbound request is made. The behaviour predates the 4.x line; it dates back to the camel-http4 and camel-netty4 components. This advisory continues the alignment CAMEL-24282 applied to the toD and enrich dynamic-URI EIPs in 4.22.0, extending the same build-time-resolution contract to the HTTP producer components. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name.
Title Apache Camel: HTTP producers resolve property placeholders in message-supplied URI override headers
Weaknesses CWE-1336
CWE-200
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N'}


Subscriptions

Apache Apache Camel Camel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: apache

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-19T12:03:40.078Z

Reserved: 2026-08-23T12:51:36.176Z

Link: CVE-2026-78164

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-19T11:17:19.403

Modified: 2026-10-19T13:16:58.663

Link: CVE-2026-78164

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-19T16:30:13Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-1336

    Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

  • CWE-200

    Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor