Description
The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop().
A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped.
The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed.
The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.
A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped.
The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed.
The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | unaffected |
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Remediation
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Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Wed, 21 Oct 2026 18:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop(). A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped. The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed. The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected. | |
| Title | NULL pointer dereference in the MCTP I2C+GPIO target binding triggerable by a peer I2C controller | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-476 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-21T18:19:34.519Z
Reserved: 2026-08-25T16:06:27.086Z
Link: CVE-2026-79976
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-21T19:17:04.060
Modified: 2026-10-21T19:17:04.060
Link: CVE-2026-79976
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
-
CWE-476
NULL Pointer Dereference