Airbyte Platform determines the workspace for authorization from a caller‑supplied field, workspaceId, in the raw JSON request body. The authorization handler copies this identifier into X‑Airbyte‑Workspace‑Id headers and the resolver consults it for each request before evaluating any resource‑derived header. Because the extractor reads the body rather than the endpoint’s schema, endpoints that expose only a resource identifier still receive the supplied workspaceId, allowing a user to perform permission checks against a workspace they select. No later step verifies that the resource’s owning workspace matches the authorised one, resulting in an authorization bypass that permits cross‑workspace reading and manipulation of sources, destinations, and connections. The effect is the ability for any member of a workspace to access, modify, trigger, or delete resources that belong to other workspaces, thereby violating confidentiality, integrity, and potentially availability.

The vulnerability affects AirbyteHQ Airbyte Platform deployed in any multitenant configuration through version 2.0.0, inclusive of all earlier releases. Users running Airbyte Platform 2.0.0 or earlier are susceptible unless a higher, patched version is in use.

The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 8.7, indicating high impact. No EPSS value is provided, so the exploit likelihood is unknown, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The attack vector requires a user with member privileges in any workspace to craft requests containing a workspaceId field that does not belong to the target resource’s workspace. Because the server fabricates the authorization header from the supplied value without cross‑checking ownership, such a request can be sent via the API, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate privileged configuration in other workspaces.