Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check

ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.

The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.

The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.

Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.

[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
Published: 2026-08-26
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

A missing bounds check in libceph’s decode_watchers() can cause the Linux kernel to read four bytes beyond the validated buffer when a Ceph OSD replies with a struct_len of zero. The garbage value read is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as a watcher count, potentially leading to an excessive allocation that can crash or exhaust kernel memory, resulting in denial of service for any client employing CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability is present in all Linux kernel builds that include the affected libceph code paths, regardless of kernel version, until the recent upstream patch is applied. Any host running a Ceph client against a Ceph OSD that can send the crafted obj_list_watch_response_t is susceptible. The fix is incorporated into newer kernel releases and can be obtained by upgrading the kernel.

Risk and Exploitability

An attacker only needs a malicious or compromised Ceph OSD node within the same Ceph cluster. By sending a crafted obj_list_watch_response_t the attacker can trigger the flaw over the normal Ceph control network without elevated privileges. EPSS is not available and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, but the kernel‑level out-of-bounds read and potential crash give the flaw a high severity. The main constraint is that the attacker must be able to reach the kernel client, typically via the internal cluster network.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 16:31 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Linux kernel to a patched release containing the libceph fix
  • If a kernel upgrade cannot be performed immediately, apply the upstream patch (commit 00ead17c7de137a692edee59f2772e6af687e8eb) from the kernel source to add the bounds check to decode_watchers()
  • As a temporary measure, restrict Ceph OSD traffic to trusted nodes or block connections from untrusted OSDs via firewall or ACLs to reduce exposure to the crafted reply

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 16:31 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 17:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads. The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count. The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight. Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: trim changelog ]
Title libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-26T14:37:24.178Z

Reserved: 2026-08-26T14:34:25.767Z

Link: CVE-2026-80557

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-26T15:17:10.400

Modified: 2026-08-26T15:17:10.400

Link: CVE-2026-80557

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:30:09Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation