Description
Robots::Validate versions from 0.3.2 before 0.3.11 for Perl allow unbounded outbound DNS queries per validation via a forward-confirmation loop that does not bound the names it queries.

_check_dns issues one PTR query for the client address, keeps the returned names matching the rule's domain, and issues a forward query for each until one resolves back to that address. Nothing bounds that list, and a client controls the reverse zone for its own address, so it chooses how many names the PTR answer holds. Net::DNS refetches a truncated answer over TCP by default, so the 512-byte UDP payload does not cap it either.

Any client whose User-Agent matches a rule with a domain reaches _check_dns. Each forward name is distinct and client-chosen, so every query misses the local cache and is resolved against the authoritative servers for that domain. The queries are synchronous, so the caller is held until all of them answer or time out.
Published: 2026-09-04
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

Robots-Validate is a Perl module that validates robots.txt files against a remote domain. The vulnerability in versions 0.3.2 through 0.3.10 allows the validation process to initiate an unbounded loop of outbound DNS queries. Each lookup is performed synchronously and continues until a PTR record resolves back to the client address, without any limit on the number or size of names queried. This can consume large amounts of network and system resources and leave the calling script blocked until all queries finish or time out.

Affected Systems

Affected systems are installations that use any version of Robots-Validate from 0.3.2 up to, but not including, 0.3.11. This includes any Perl application that imports or otherwise relies on the Robots::Validate module within that version range.

Risk and Exploitability

Risk is elevated by the lack of a bound to the DNS query list and the synchronous nature of the calls. The EPSS score is not available and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, but the potential for a local or authenticated attacker to control the PTR zone and thereby dictate an arbitrarily large list of DNS queries makes resource exhaustion a credible threat. Exploitation requires that the requester's User‑Agent string matches a rule that triggers the validation routine, and that the attacker can influence the reverse zone for their IP address, thereby selecting the size of the PTR response.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 4, 2026 at 13:52 UTC.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to Robots-Validate 0.3.11 or later.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to Robots-Validate 0.3.11 or newer.
  • If upgrade is not immediately feasible, review the User‑Agent rules that invoke validation and temporarily disable or remove those that trigger DNS lookups, or adjust the module’s configuration to enforce a maximum number of forward queries per validation cycle.
  • Apply network‑level controls such as rate‑limiting or filtering of outbound DNS traffic originating from your application to mitigate potential denial‑of‑service impact.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 4, 2026 at 13:52 UTC.

Tracking

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History

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 12:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Robots::Validate versions from 0.3.2 before 0.3.11 for Perl allow unbounded outbound DNS queries per validation via a forward-confirmation loop that does not bound the names it queries. _check_dns issues one PTR query for the client address, keeps the returned names matching the rule's domain, and issues a forward query for each until one resolves back to that address. Nothing bounds that list, and a client controls the reverse zone for its own address, so it chooses how many names the PTR answer holds. Net::DNS refetches a truncated answer over TCP by default, so the 512-byte UDP payload does not cap it either. Any client whose User-Agent matches a rule with a domain reaches _check_dns. Each forward name is distinct and client-chosen, so every query misses the local cache and is resolved against the authoritative servers for that domain. The queries are synchronous, so the caller is held until all of them answer or time out.
Title Robots::Validate versions from 0.3.2 before 0.3.11 for Perl allow unbounded outbound DNS queries per validation via a forward-confirmation loop that does not bound the names it queries
Weaknesses CWE-405
CWE-770
References

Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: CPANSec

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-04T15:07:21.822Z

Reserved: 2026-08-28T12:56:46.972Z

Link: CVE-2026-82309

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-04T13:20:10.667

Modified: 2026-09-04T15:17:35.840

Link: CVE-2026-82309

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-04T14:00:05Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-405

    Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

  • CWE-770

    Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling