CVE-2026-82685

Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication

Published Sep 17, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 7.6 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record.

AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

An authenticated attacker can supply a confirmation token that was issued to a different user and have the system apply the token’s changes to that user’s account. Because the library does not verify that the token’s subject matches the target record, an attacker can rewrite another person’s email address and set the confirmed flag, effectively taking control of the victim’s account. This is a classic authorization bypass identified as CWE‑639, where the system incorrectly accepts a user‑controlled key—here, the confirmation token—as valid for any account.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects Team Alembic’s AshAuthentication library. All releases from 0.5.0 up to, but not including, 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0‑rc.0 up to, but not including, 5.0.0‑rc.14 are impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 7.6, indicating a high severity. The EPSS metric is currently unavailable, but the lack of a KEV listing suggests limited public exploitation at this time. The likely attack vector is a remote, authenticated user who has a legitimate account and can initiate an email change. The attacker generates a confirmation token for their own account and replays it against another user’s record, forcing a change that can be followed by a standard password reset to gain complete control. This exploitation path requires only the ability to create an account and request an email change, making the threat significant for any deployment of the affected library.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade AshAuthentication to a patched release—check the GitHub advisory or the commit log to identify the latest fixed version and update the dependency accordingly.
  • Disable the forced e‑mail change functionality (force_change_attributes/2) until a patch is applied, or route that feature through a layer that validates the token’s subject against the target user.
  • Implement or re‑enable multi‑factor authentication for all accounts and monitor for unusual e‑mail changes or login attempts to detect potential takeover attempts before the patch is deployed.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 17, 2026 at 22:17 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Title Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication
First Time appeared Team-alembic
Team-alembic ash Authentication
Weaknesses CWE-639
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Team-alembic
Team-alembic ash Authentication
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-639

    Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 20, 2026, 6:03 AM
Reserved
Aug 31, 2026, 12:45 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Sep 17, 2026, 2:17 PM
Modified
Nov 20, 2026, 6:17 AM