The vulnerability allows an attacker to release a malicious SAML assertion that the Airflow AWS auth manager accepts because the response is not bound to the originating request. The failure to require an InResponseTo token permits a logged‑in user to be silently logged into the attacker’s Airflow account without any credential. The victim’s subsequent actions are performed within the attacker’s session, effectively hijacking the account. This is a pure CSRF flaw that grants full authentication privilege to the attacker.

Any deployment that uses the Apache Airflow Amazon provider with the AWS auth manager and SAML authentication is affected. The description specifically states that a victim only needs to visit an attacker‑controlled page; no Airflow account or credentials are required to leverage the flaw. The fix is provided in version 9.38.0 of apache‑airflow‑providers‑amazon, so any older version is vulnerable.

The EPSS score is < 1% and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog; however, the lack of response binding provides a clear, unimpeded attack path. The CVSS score of 8.8 classifies this as a high severity flaw. An unauthenticated attacker who can trick a victim’s browser into loading a crafted page can complete the SAML login flow in the victim’s browser, arriving at an attacker‑controlled Airflow session. No additional privileges or setup are needed on the victim side beyond the trivial act of visiting a URL. Once logged in, the attacker can execute arbitrary work in the victim’s account, effectively hijacking the session and escalating to full malicious activity.