CVE-2026-8720

HMAC-BLAKE2 final discards message when key length exceeds block size

Published Jun 25, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. When the supplied key is longer than the BLAKE2 block size the key-hashing branch reinitialized the running hash state, discarding the accumulated message data, so the resulting MAC depended only on the key and not on the message being authenticated. This bug is specific to the HMAC-BLAKE2 APIs that were added in wolfSSL version 5.9.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The flaw causes the HMAC-BLAKE2 finalization functions to discard the message when the supplied key is longer than the BLAKE2 block size. As a result, the MAC computed depends solely on the key and not on the authenticated data, allowing an attacker to forge a valid MAC for any message. This undermines the integrity guarantees that HMAC is meant to provide.

Affected Systems

wolfSSL libraries, specifically the HMAC‑BLAKE2 API introduced in version 5.9.0. The issue affects any build that uses these functions with keys exceeding the block size. Versions prior to 5.9.0 are not impacted, while the status of later versions is not specified in the data.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 5.9 places this vulnerability in the medium severity range. EPSS data is unavailable and it is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating no publicly known exploitation at present. Nevertheless, the ability to forge a MAC can lead to severe consequences for applications that rely on HMAC‑BLAKE2 for authentication, and the attack vector is plausible through any channel that allows an attacker to provide a key longer than the block size and invoke the affected functions.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade wolfSSL to a patched version that fixes the HMAC‑BLAKE2 key handling flaw.
  • If an immediate upgrade is not possible, avoid using the HMAC‑BLAKE2 APIs with keys longer than the block size; use conforming key lengths or disable that authentication method.
  • Review and modify application code that derives HMAC keys to ensure they never exceed the BLAKE2 block size, and add tests to verify that MACs still depend on the message data.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on June 25, 2026 at 22:20 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Vendors & Products Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. When the supplied key is longer than the BLAKE2 block size the key-hashing branch reinitialized the running hash state, discarding the accumulated message data, so the resulting MAC depended only on the key and not on the message being authenticated. This bug is specific to the HMAC-BLAKE2 APIs that were added in wolfSSL version 5.9.0.
Title HMAC-BLAKE2 final discards message when key length exceeds block size
Weaknesses CWE-354
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-354

    Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
wolfSSL
Published
Updated
Jun 26, 2026, 10:35 AM
Reserved
May 15, 2026, 10:33 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jun 25, 2026, 10:17 PM
Modified
Jun 27, 2026, 7:43 PM