Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks

When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero,
pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as
&chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the
subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the
ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at
sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults.

A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire:
xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than
rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk
onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs,
so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves
ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated
Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four
PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle
on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read
and a general protection fault.

xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk
pcl_alloc_write()
chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */
list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks)
/* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */

svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl)
pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk)
pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */
segment->rs_handle /* OOB read -> GPF */

Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses
ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the
loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration
range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound,
so no caller changes are needed.
Published: 2026-09-11
Score: 9.1 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Denial of Service
Action: Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

An unsigned integer underflow in the Linux kernel’s SVCRDMA implementation causes an out‑of‑bounds read when a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose segment count is zero. The buggy macro calculates an inclusive upper bound that wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF, causing the loop body to walk memory beyond the intended flex array and trigger a general protection fault. This fault crashes the kernel, resulting in a denial‑of‑service condition. The weakness corresponds to CWE‑125, meaning it is an out‑of‑bounds read vulnerability.

Affected Systems

Linux kernels that expose the SunRPC RDMA interface through the net/sunrpc/xprtrdma code path are affected. Any system running a kernel version prior to the fix and that accepts RDMA traffic will contain the vulnerable code. The fix was made in the svcrdma component, so all distributions that ship the affected kernel will be impacted unless the code path is disabled.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS base score is 5.9 and the EPSS score is less than 1 %, indicating a low probability of widespread exploitation. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The likely attack vector is remote: an attacker can craft RDMA packets that advertise a zero‑segment chunk and send them to an exposed SunRPC RDMA service, causing the kernel to crash. Because the flaw does not provide code execution, the main risk is availability loss on a vulnerable host. Exposed RDMA interfaces increase risk; hosts without RDMA services or with the interface disabled are effectively immune.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 13, 2026 at 03:30 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Linux kernel to a version that includes the CVE‑2026‑89532 fix.
  • If a kernel upgrade is not feasible, disable the SunRPC RDMA services to eliminate the vulnerable code path.
  • Block or filter inbound RDMA traffic at the network perimeter to reduce exposure to crafted packets.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 13, 2026 at 03:30 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Sun, 13 Sep 2026 06:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H'}


Sat, 12 Sep 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125

Fri, 11 Sep 2026 23:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero, pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as &chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults. A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire: xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs, so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read and a general protection fault. xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk pcl_alloc_write() chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */ list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks) /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */ svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl) pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */ segment->rs_handle /* OOB read -> GPF */ Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound, so no caller changes are needed.
Title svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-13T06:30:28.416Z

Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.720Z

Link: CVE-2026-89532

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-11T20:19:36.117

Modified: 2026-09-11T20:19:36.117

Link: CVE-2026-89532

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-09-11T19:44:11Z

Links: CVE-2026-89532 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-13T03:45:18Z

Weaknesses