Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload

The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.

That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.

Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.

An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.
Published: 2026-09-17
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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History

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.
Title ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-17T16:07:31.423Z

Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.793Z

Link: CVE-2026-90220

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-17T17:17:17.440

Modified: 2026-09-17T17:17:17.440

Link: CVE-2026-90220

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.