Description
org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),
which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file
it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that
the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:

* if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;
* otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.


Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.






ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.
Published: 2026-09-29
Score: 9.8 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Privilege escalation from manager to admin via path traversal in config service
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

Apache Karaf allows a caller with the manager role to write arbitrary configuration files by exploiting a path traversal flaw in the ConfigRepositoryImpl.update method. The flaw occurs when a property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry or when the configuration PID itself contains ".." segments, allowing the resulting file path to reference any location writable by the Karaf process. By writing to critical system files such as users.properties, ACL configurations, or management settings, an attacker can grant themselves admin rights or otherwise hijack the container’s security model. This is a classic example of file path manipulation (CWE-22) that directly impacts integrity and confidentiality of the system administrator controls.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the Apache Karaf platform. All installed instances that have not applied a patch for the path traversal flaw in the config service are potentially impacted. No specific version information is provided, so any deployment of Apache Karaf that relies on the vulnerable ConfigRepositoryImpl code is at risk.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.8 indicates critical severity, while the EPSS score of less than 1% suggests exploitation is unlikely but possible. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. Because the flaw is exercised via the “config” MBean and config:* shell commands, an attacker needs access to a Karaf process with the manager role, typically through JMX or local command execution. The likely attack vector is remote JMX access if enabled, although local exploitation is also feasible if an attacker gains file or command line access to the Karaf instance.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 1, 2026 at 16:59 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Apache Karaf to a version that contains the path traversal fix for ConfigRepositoryImpl
  • Restrict or remove the manager role from the config MBean and config:* shell commands in the Karaf ACL configuration
  • Limit JMX exposure by hardening network access or disabling JMX remotely, ensuring only trusted management processes can connect

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 1, 2026 at 16:59 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Wed, 07 Oct 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Thu, 01 Oct 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Apache
Apache karaf
Vendors & Products Apache
Apache karaf

Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.
Title Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation
Weaknesses CWE-22
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: apache

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-01T14:10:47.838Z

Reserved: 2026-09-14T16:27:00.736Z

Link: CVE-2026-91012

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-29T09:15:41.656Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2026-09-29T09:17:09.087

Modified: 2026-10-07T20:16:25.743

Link: CVE-2026-91012

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-09-29T08:34:11Z

Links: CVE-2026-91012 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-01T17:00:15Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-22

    Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')