CVE-2026-93657

hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass

Published Sep 18, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 do not propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through its lookup APIs, causing forged responses to be accepted as valid. This flaw is a CWE‑354 example of improper handling of edge cases, allowing attackers to supply malicious DNS records that appear authenticated. As a result, an adversary controlling an authoritative zone or intercepting DNS traffic can redirect clients, facilitate phishing, or perform man‑in‑the‑middle attacks without requiring local privileges on the resolver.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects all releases of hickory-dns/hickory-resolver older than 0.26.2. Any deployment that uses one of these versions, regardless of operating system or platform, is vulnerable if it relies on the resolver’s DNSSEC validation logic. The risk is mitigated only when a newer version is run or when network controls override the resolver’s behavior.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.7 classifies this as a high‑severity flaw. The EPSS score is below 1%, indicating a very low but non‑zero probability that this vulnerability will be actively exploited. The flaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The likely attack vector is straightforward: an attacker who can modify zone data or inject traffic on the network path can exploit the absence of proof propagation. No elevated rights or local access are required; the flaw can be leveraged remotely. Until a fixed version is installed, the potential for widespread compromise exists, especially in environments that depend on DNSSEC for trust validation.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update hickory-resolver to version 0.26.2 or later to apply the DNSSEC proof propagation fix.
  • If an update cannot be applied immediately, replace the resolver with a DNS service that performs full DNSSEC validation and configure it to reject any responses lacking trusted signatures.
  • Apply network controls such as firewall rules or DNS over TLS to limit exposure to attackers controlling authoritative zones or intercepting DNS traffic, and monitor for anomalous responses.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 23, 2026 at 01:40 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Hickory-dns
Hickory-dns hickory-resolver
Vendors & Products Hickory-dns
Hickory-dns hickory-resolver
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.
Title hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass
Weaknesses CWE-347
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-347

    Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • CWE-354

    Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
VulnCheck
Published
Updated
Sep 21, 2026, 8:51 PM
Reserved
Sep 18, 2026, 1:30 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Sep 18, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Sep 22, 2026, 8:53 PM
Severity
Important
Public date
Sep 18, 2026, 2:23 PM