The Tauri updater plugin verifies binaries with minisign signatures, but these signatures cover only the raw binary data. The accompanying update manifest, which contains the version, download URL, and signature, is fetched over TLS and is never itself signed or authenticated. The only anti‑rollback check that compares the manifest’s version field to the current version is unsound because the version number is unsigned. Consequently, an attacker able to supply a crafted manifest can force the application to install an older signed release without having the developer’s private key, allowing the installation of malicious code. The effect of this flaw is that a compromised update endpoint can downgrade an application to any older release, potentially replacing it with a malicious binary. An attacker does not need privileged access to the developer’s signing key; control of the network path to the update server is sufficient. This results in loss of integrity and possible remote code execution. The vulnerability is limited to the Tauri framework’s tauri‑plugin‑updater component, where the manifest is never authenticated and the version comparison is performed on unsigned data. The flaw cannot be exploited by arbitrary network traffic unless the attacker has influence over the update server or can intercept the TLS session, but once this control is achieved the downgrade is straightforward.

The tauri‑plugin‑updater component of the Tauri framework, specifically all versions prior to 2.12.0, is affected. The vulnerability exists in the updater’s handling of the update manifest and the comparison against the current version. Anyone using Tauri applications that rely on the tauri‑plugin‑updater without enabling the upgraded signature option is susceptible.

The CVSS score of 5.9 indicates a moderate severity. The EPSS score of less than 1 % shows a very low current exploitation probability, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Nonetheless, the attack vector requires attacker control over the update endpoint or the ability to serve a crafted manifest over TLS, which is relatively easy for an internal adversary or a compromised server. The potential impact of executing malicious code far outweighs the exploitation probability, and the lack of a signed manifest means any attacker with update‑server authority can effect the downgrade.