Description
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.



The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.



How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.



One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Published: 2026-09-23
Score: 8.8 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Remote Code Execution
Action: Patch Now
AI Analysis

Impact

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API that includes an unauthenticated /apps/install endpoint. The endpoint accepts a payload describing a Hugging Face Space and installs that Python package using uv or pip. Because the API has no authentication, any actor on the local network may send a POST request that causes the daemon to execute arbitrary build and setup scripts supplied by the chosen Space. This allows an attacker to run malicious code on the robot with the daemon’s privileges. The vulnerability illustrates missing authentication (CWE‑306) and execution of code from an untrusted source (CWE‑494).

Affected Systems

The affected system is the Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini. Firmware builds in the 1.x series, including the recent v1.11.0 release, are vulnerable. The issue exists in both wired and wireless variants; on the wireless unit the API binds to 0.0.0.0, permitting any device on the LAN to reach the endpoint. No formal patch release was announced, so prior to an official fix, all 1.x firmware versions remain exposed.

Risk and Exploitability

With a CVSS score of 8.8 the vulnerability is rated high severity. An attacker does not need credentials, a browser or any special setup; a simple HTTP request from any host that can resolve the robot’s IP can trigger the install and execute arbitrary code. The EPSS score is not available, but the high CVSS and lack of mitigation in the community raise significant risk. The attack vector is local network; successful exploitation grants full control over the robot’s software environment. The issue is not yet listed in the CISA KEV catalog, which does not diminish its potential impact.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 23, 2026 at 15:00 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Reachy Mini firmware or apply an official patch that adds authentication to the /apps/install endpoint.
  • Restrict the device’s API access by limiting the binding address to localhost or a trusted network, or by placing the robot in a VLAN or subnet that is not reachable by untrusted devices.
  • Block or disable the /apps/install endpoint using a local firewall or reverse proxy that requires authentication, preventing unauthenticated code installation.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 23, 2026 at 15:00 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Wed, 23 Sep 2026 16:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Pollen-robotics
Pollen-robotics reachy Mini
Vendors & Products Pollen-robotics
Pollen-robotics reachy Mini

Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Wed, 23 Sep 2026 11:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Title Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint
Weaknesses CWE-306
CWE-494
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Subscriptions

Pollen-robotics Reachy Mini
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: JFROG

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-23T13:59:45.518Z

Reserved: 2026-09-23T09:53:08.502Z

Link: CVE-2026-96455

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-23T13:59:40.483Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-23T11:17:18.690

Modified: 2026-09-23T15:17:32.700

Link: CVE-2026-96455

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-23T16:30:07Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-306

    Missing Authentication for Critical Function

  • CWE-494

    Download of Code Without Integrity Check