Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic

Take the following unprivileged program as an example:

r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */
...
14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */
15: r9 = r0

Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():

verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out
of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}
r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)

What happens:

1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new
offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.

2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,
__mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is
re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by
reg_bounds_sync().

3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via
sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current
register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be
verified directly as a speculative path.

4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():
at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original
offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two
are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15
(r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and
trips the warning.

var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two
ways to keep the snapshot consistent:

1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or
2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it
only after the snapshot.

The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking
sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state
it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move
__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative
snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative
path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and
re-derived by reg_bounds_sync().
Published: 2026-09-25
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Kernel privilege escalation via BPF bound-check bypass
Action: Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

A flaw in the Linux kernel BPF verifier allows an unprivileged user to craft a program that performs speculative pointer arithmetic without maintaining correct register bounds invariants. The bug leads to an inconsistent state in the verifier’s register tracking, which can potentially be exploited to bypass bounds checks and read or write arbitrary kernel memory, thereby enabling privilege escalation. The impact is confined to the kernel context, but since BPF programs run with user space privileges, an attacker can elevate privileges with a crafted BPF program.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the Linux kernel, specifically the BPF subsystem that validates byte‑code programs. All released kernel versions that include the BPF verifier before the security fix are affected; exact version ranges are not specified, so any kernel where the BPF verifier has not been patched is potentially vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is not provided, but the lack of an EPSS score indicates no data on current exploit prevalence. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Because the flaw operates in speculative execution paths of the BPF verifier, an attacker with the ability to upload a BPF program can trigger the bug and potentially manipulate kernel memory. The exploit requires knowledge of the BPF byte‑code format and the ability to generate a program that exercises the specific verifier path. While proof‑of‑concept exploitation may not be publicly documented, the underlying flaw exposes a serious kernel escalation vector should it be actively leveraged.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 25, 2026 at 12:11 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply a patched Linux kernel that incorporates the BPF verifier fix from the Linux kernel commits referenced
  • If an immediate kernel upgrade is not possible, disable unprivileged BPF program loading or enforce strict BPF policy to restrict unsafe operations
  • Monitor system logs for BPF verifier warnings and investigate any unexpected BPF activity

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 25, 2026 at 12:11 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Fri, 25 Sep 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20

Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic Take the following unprivileged program as an example: r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */ ... 14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */ 15: r9 = r0 Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check(): verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0} r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0) What happens: 1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges. 2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds, __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by reg_bounds_sync(). 3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be verified directly as a speculative path. 4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync(): at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15 (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and trips the warning. var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two ways to keep the snapshot consistent: 1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or 2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it only after the snapshot. The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move __mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and re-derived by reg_bounds_sync().
Title bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-25T10:36:23.412Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.320Z

Link: CVE-2026-98151

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-25T11:17:46.693

Modified: 2026-09-25T11:17:46.693

Link: CVE-2026-98151

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-25T12:15:16Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation