Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga

ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().

ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.

If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.

That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...

syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug

"WARNING in do_new_mount"

since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:

mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs")
ntfs_create_inode()
d_instantiate()
user_path_at() finds the dentry
do_lock_mount()
inode_lock(inode)
namespace_lock()
unlock_new_inode()
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key()
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem)
unlock_mount()
inode_unlock(inode)

The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody
holds:

DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...):
count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0,
curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write
Call Trace:
inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887

On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as

DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current)
WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock

The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on
that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory
racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via
inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow().

Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode().
All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and
keep using discard_new_inode().

May we never see this fscking bug report again.
Published: 2026-10-18
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Denial of Service via kernel lock corruption
Action: Patch kernel
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability resides in the Linux kernel’s NTFS‑3 file system driver. During the creation of a new directory on a freshly mounted NTFS image, a race condition between the directory creation path and a concurrent mount operation can corrupt an inode’s read‑write lock. The lock’s count is under‑decremented during an unsafe unlock sequence, causing a warning and preventing subsequent inode locks. This corruption can result in deadlocks and potentially corrupt path resolution, leading to a loss of file system integrity and service availability.

Affected Systems

All Linux kernel builds that include the NTFS‑3 driver are potentially affected. No specific version range is provided; the issue is fixed in the latest kernel releases that replace the legacy d_instantiate() call with d_instantiate_new() and remove unnecessary unlock calls.

Risk and Exploitability

The bug can only be triggered in a local context where a user can perform both a directory creation and a mount operation on the same NTFS volume. Typical mitigation requires privileged mount access (CAP_SYS_ADMIN or root). No publicly known exploits or exploits in the wild are documented, and the EPSS score is currently not available. The risk level remains moderate to high for systems that expose untrusted NTFS content to privileged users. The Kernel Integrity Vulnerability (KEV) list does not currently include this issue, and the vendor's fix provides complete remediation.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 19, 2026 at 00:00 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to the latest Linux kernel that includes the ntfs3 driver fix which replaces d_instantiate() with d_instantiate_new() and removes the unsafe unlock sequence.
  • Reboot the system to ensure the patched kernel is active and unloaded any old ntfs3 modules.
  • If the environment relies on legacy ntfs3 modules or custom mounts, use mount options to restrict concurrent directory creation and mount operations, or disable the ntfs3 driver until the patch is applied.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 19, 2026 at 00:00 UTC.

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History

Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-665

Sun, 18 Oct 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until unlock_new_inode(). ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode. If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the i_mutex_dir_key class. That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already hold by now... syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug "WARNING in do_new_mount" since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir() takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently: mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs") ntfs_create_inode() d_instantiate() user_path_at() finds the dentry do_lock_mount() inode_lock(inode) namespace_lock() unlock_new_inode() lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem) unlock_mount() inode_unlock(inode) The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody holds: DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write Call Trace: inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline] do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887 On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current) WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow(). Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode(). All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and keep using discard_new_inode(). May we never see this fscking bug report again.
Title fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

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Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-18T15:18:06.921Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.356Z

Link: CVE-2026-98539

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-18T16:17:05.733

Modified: 2026-10-18T16:17:05.733

Link: CVE-2026-98539

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-19T03:15:14Z

Weaknesses