Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()
em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing
it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into
conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr()
then copies the full struct to the netlink response.
KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path,
one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620
nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130
em_text_dump+0x291/0x550
Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550
Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized
I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in
practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and
the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual
production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a
kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a
userspace reproducer on request.
The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size.
Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced
it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition.
Zero-initialising the struct closes it.
net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()
em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing
it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into
conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr()
then copies the full struct to the netlink response.
KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path,
one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620
nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130
em_text_dump+0x291/0x550
Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550
Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized
I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in
practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and
the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual
production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a
kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a
userspace reproducer on request.
The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size.
Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced
it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition.
Zero-initialising the struct closes it.
Published:
2026-10-18
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
|
||||||||||||||||||
| Linux | Linux | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Sun, 18 Oct 2026 15:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump() em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr() then copies the full struct to the netlink response. KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path, one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620 nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130 em_text_dump+0x291/0x550 Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550 Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a userspace reproducer on request. The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size. Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition. Zero-initialising the struct closes it. | |
| Title | net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-18T15:18:57.204Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.358Z
Link: CVE-2026-98584
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.