CVE-2026-99296

libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len

Published Nov 16, 2026 CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len

handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size
of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the
monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to
get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever
generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size
however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct
ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes
ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never
received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or
bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and
is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not
flag it.

req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),
ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back
from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes
it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:

rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)
Call Trace:
...
kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),
handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().
A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one
takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph:
bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side
use of front_alloc_len in this file.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

A bounding error in libceph causes the kernel to decode a monitor command acknowledgement using the total allocated buffer size instead of the actual number of bytes received. When the monitor sends a reply shorter than the allocated size, the decode routine reads uninitialized memory, potentially causing a kernel page fault and a fatal exception. The vulnerability leads to a system crash, resulting in a denial of service on the affected machine.

Affected Systems

The issue is present in the Linux kernel, impacting all kernel builds that include the libceph subsystem before the patch. No specific version ranges are listed in the advisory; the bug applies to any kernel that has not yet applied the commit that corrects the length used for decoding.

Risk and Exploitability

The likely attack vector involves an attacker who can influence the contents of a CEPH monitor reply to the system, which is inferred from the vulnerability description. The vulnerability is local to the kernel and does not provide remote code execution, but it can be triggered by sending a malformed reply from a CEPH monitor if such a condition is present, which is inferred from the scenario described. No EPSS score is present, and the issue is not recorded in CISA’s KEV catalog. The severity is high because a single malformed ACK can cause a kernel panic, but the attack vector would likely be limited to environments running Ceph services or with access to the monitor network.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update the Linux kernel to a version that includes the patch fixing the incorrect buffer length usage (commit d3c32939fa0e).
  • If immediate kernel upgrade is not possible, mitigate exposure by restricting Ceph monitor traffic to trusted hosts only—configure firewall rules to allow CEPH communication only from known Ceph cluster members.
  • Continuously monitor kernel logs for 'Unable to handle page fault' or 'Oops' messages that indicate a potential exploit; investigate any such incidents promptly.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 16, 2026 at 11:52 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Linux linux
Vendors & Products Linux linux
Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20
CWE-457
CWE-680
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it. req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(), ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults: rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105) Call Trace: ... kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(), handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply(). A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side use of front_alloc_len in this file.
Title libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References
Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation

  • CWE-457

    Use of Uninitialized Variable

  • CWE-680

    Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
Nov 16, 2026, 9:59 AM
Reserved
Sep 25, 2026, 10:25 AM
Status
Received
Published
Nov 16, 2026, 10:17 AM
Modified
Nov 16, 2026, 10:17 AM