CVE-2026-99383

smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid

Published Nov 19, 2026 CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid

When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no
outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the
offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting
the credits the server granted in it. The plaintext unknown-frame path in
cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with
smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the
plaintext path would not.

This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after
the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived
connection the client's credit count drifts down and can eventually starve
it of the ability to issue requests. The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so
the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and
are safe to apply.

Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame,
and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.

Analysis

No analysis available yet

Remediation

No remediation available yet

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting the credits the server granted in it. The plaintext unknown-frame path in cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the plaintext path would not. This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived connection the client's credit count drifts down and can eventually starve it of the ability to issue requests. The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and are safe to apply. Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame, and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.
Title smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References
Weaknesses

No weakness.

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
Nov 19, 2026, 2:38 PM
Reserved
Sep 25, 2026, 10:25 AM
Status
Received
Published
Nov 19, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Nov 19, 2026, 3:17 PM