| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Do not map lowcore with identity mapping
Since the identity mapping is pinned to address zero the lowcore is always
also mapped to address zero, this happens regardless of the relocate_lowcore
command line option. If the option is specified the lowcore is mapped
twice, instead of only once.
This means that NULL pointer accesses will succeed instead of causing an
exception (low address protection still applies, but covers only parts).
To fix this never map the first two pages of physical memory with the
identity mapping. |
| A flaw has been found in elunez eladmin up to 2.7. This impacts the function updateUserEmail of the file /api/users/updateEmail/ of the component Email Address Handler. Executing manipulation of the argument id/email can lead to improper authorization. The attack may be performed from remote. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. It is required to know the RSA-encrypted password of the attacked user account. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: prevent ethtool ops after shutdown
A crash can occur if an ethtool operation is invoked
after shutdown() is called.
shutdown() is invoked during system shutdown to stop DMA operations
without performing expensive deallocations. It is discouraged to
unregister the netdev in this path, so the device may still be visible
to userspace and kernel helpers.
In gve, shutdown() tears down most internal data structures. If an
ethtool operation is dispatched after shutdown(), it will dereference
freed or NULL pointers, leading to a kernel panic. While graceful
shutdown normally quiesces userspace before invoking the reboot
syscall, forced shutdowns (as observed on GCP VMs) can still trigger
this path.
Fix by calling netif_device_detach() in shutdown().
This marks the device as detached so the ethtool ioctl handler
will skip dispatching operations to the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out()
BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:
[ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0
[ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e
[ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e
[ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I
[ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2
[ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E
[ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4
[ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k
[ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6
[ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0
[ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0
[ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5
[ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0
[ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0
[ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0
[ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3
[ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0
[ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4
[ 16.456654] Call Trace :
[ 16.456832] <TASK >
[ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0
[ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0
[ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0
[ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0
[ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0
[ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0
[ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0
[ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0
[ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0
[ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0
[ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0
[ 16.461453] </TASK >
[ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ]
[ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0
[ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590
The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:
smc_listen_work | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk) |
smc_listen_out_connected() |
| \- smc_listen_out |
| | \- release_sock |
| |- sk->sk_data_ready() |
| fd = accept();
| close(fd);
| \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))
Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds
the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer
that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the
filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across
function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer
hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done
for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a
bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the
iterator's hash between writers and readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix backlog accounting in qdisc_dequeue_internal
This issue applies for the following qdiscs: hhf, fq, fq_codel, and
fq_pie, and occurs in their change handlers when adjusting to the new
limit. The problem is the following in the values passed to the
subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call given a tbf parent:
When the tbf parent runs out of tokens, skbs of these qdiscs will
be placed in gso_skb. Their peek handlers are qdisc_peek_dequeued,
which accounts for both qlen and backlog. However, in the case of
qdisc_dequeue_internal, ONLY qlen is accounted for when pulling
from gso_skb. This means that these qdiscs are missing a
qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec when dropping packets to satisfy the
new limit in their change handlers.
One can observe this issue with the following (with tc patched to
support a limit of 0):
export TARGET=fq
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 8bit burst 100b latency 1ms
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 1000
echo ''; echo 'add child'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
ping -I lo -f -c2 -s32 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 2>&1 >/dev/null
echo ''; echo 'after ping'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc change dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 0
echo ''; echo 'after limit drop'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 2: parent 1:1 sfq
echo ''; echo 'post graft'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
The second to last show command shows 0 packets but a positive
number (74) of backlog bytes. The problem becomes clearer in the
last show command, where qdisc_purge_queue triggers
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog with the positive backlog and causes an
underflow in the tbf parent's backlog (4096 Mb instead of 0).
To fix this issue, the codepath for all clients of qdisc_dequeue_internal
has been simplified: codel, pie, hhf, fq, fq_pie, and fq_codel.
qdisc_dequeue_internal handles the backlog adjustments for all cases that
do not directly use the dequeue handler.
The old fq_codel_change limit adjustment loop accumulated the arguments to
the subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call through the cstats field.
However, this is confusing and error prone as fq_codel_dequeue could also
potentially mutate this field (which qdisc_dequeue_internal calls in the
non gso_skb case), so we have unified the code here with other qdiscs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/ism: fix concurrency management in ism_cmd()
The s390x ISM device data sheet clearly states that only one
request-response sequence is allowable per ISM function at any point in
time. Unfortunately as of today the s390/ism driver in Linux does not
honor that requirement. This patch aims to rectify that.
This problem was discovered based on Aliaksei's bug report which states
that for certain workloads the ISM functions end up entering error state
(with PEC 2 as seen from the logs) after a while and as a consequence
connections handled by the respective function break, and for future
connection requests the ISM device is not considered -- given it is in a
dysfunctional state. During further debugging PEC 3A was observed as
well.
A kernel message like
[ 1211.244319] zpci: 061a:00:00.0: Event 0x2 reports an error for PCI function 0x61a
is a reliable indicator of the stated function entering error state
with PEC 2. Let me also point out that a kernel message like
[ 1211.244325] zpci: 061a:00:00.0: The ism driver bound to the device does not support error recovery
is a reliable indicator that the ISM function won't be auto-recovered
because the ISM driver currently lacks support for it.
On a technical level, without this synchronization, commands (inputs to
the FW) may be partially or fully overwritten (corrupted) by another CPU
trying to issue commands on the same function. There is hard evidence that
this can lead to DMB token values being used as DMB IOVAs, leading to
PEC 2 PCI events indicating invalid DMA. But this is only one of the
failure modes imaginable. In theory even completely losing one command
and executing another one twice and then trying to interpret the outputs
as if the command we intended to execute was actually executed and not
the other one is also possible. Frankly, I don't feel confident about
providing an exhaustive list of possible consequences. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
open_tree_attr: do not allow id-mapping changes without OPEN_TREE_CLONE
As described in commit 7a54947e727b ('Merge patch series "fs: allow
changing idmappings"'), open_tree_attr(2) was necessary in order to
allow for a detached mount to be created and have its idmappings changed
without the risk of any racing threads operating on it. For this reason,
mount_setattr(2) still does not allow for id-mappings to be changed.
However, there was a bug in commit 2462651ffa76 ("fs: allow changing
idmappings") which allowed users to bypass this restriction by calling
open_tree_attr(2) *without* OPEN_TREE_CLONE.
can_idmap_mount() prevented this bug from allowing an attached
mountpoint's id-mapping from being modified (thanks to an is_anon_ns()
check), but this still allows for detached (but visible) mounts to have
their be id-mapping changed. This risks the same UAF and locking issues
as described in the merge commit, and was likely unintentional. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rainshadow-cec: fix TOCTOU race condition in rain_interrupt()
In the interrupt handler rain_interrupt(), the buffer full check on
rain->buf_len is performed before acquiring rain->buf_lock. This
creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, as
rain->buf_len is concurrently accessed and modified in the work
handler rain_irq_work_handler() under the same lock.
Multiple interrupt invocations can race, with each reading buf_len
before it becomes full and then proceeding. This can lead to both
interrupts attempting to write to the buffer, incrementing buf_len
beyond its capacity (DATA_SIZE) and causing a buffer overflow.
Fix this bug by moving the spin_lock() to before the buffer full
check. This ensures that the check and the subsequent buffer modification
are performed atomically, preventing the race condition. An corresponding
spin_unlock() is added to the overflow path to correctly release the
lock.
This possible bug was found by an experimental static analysis tool
developed by our team. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix stack protector issue in send_ipi_data()
Function kvm_io_bus_read() is called in function send_ipi_data(), buffer
size of parameter *val should be at least 8 bytes. Since some emulation
functions like loongarch_ipi_readl() and kvm_eiointc_read() will write
the buffer *val with 8 bytes signed extension regardless parameter len.
Otherwise there will be buffer overflow issue when CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
is enabled. The bug report is shown as follows:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: send_ipi_data+0x194/0x1a0 [kvm]
CPU: 11 UID: 107 PID: 2692 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #102 PREEMPT(full)
Stack : 9000000005901568 0000000000000000 9000000003af371c 900000013c68c000
900000013c68f850 900000013c68f858 0000000000000000 900000013c68f998
900000013c68f990 900000013c68f990 900000013c68f6c0 fffffffffffdb058
fffffffffffdb0e0 900000013c68f858 911e1d4d39cf0ec2 9000000105657a00
0000000000000001 fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000578 282049464555206e
6f73676e6f6f4c20 0000000000000001 00000000086b4000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005709968 90000000058f9000
900000013c68fa68 900000013c68fab4 90000000029279f0 900000010153f940
900000010001f360 0000000000000000 9000000003af3734 000000004390000c
00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
...
Call Trace:
[<9000000003af3734>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
[<9000000003aed168>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c
[<9000000003ad0ab0>] vpanic+0x108/0x2c4
[<9000000003ad0ca8>] panic+0x3c/0x40
[<9000000004eb0a1c>] __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x18
[<ffff8000023473f8>] send_ipi_data+0x190/0x1a0 [kvm]
[<ffff8000023313e4>] __kvm_io_bus_write+0xa4/0xe8 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233147c>] kvm_io_bus_write+0x54/0x90 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233f9f8>] kvm_emu_iocsr+0x180/0x310 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233fe08>] kvm_handle_gspr+0x280/0x478 [kvm]
[<ffff8000023443e8>] kvm_handle_exit+0xc0/0x130 [kvm] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: fix race conditions in ppp_fill_forward_path
ppp_fill_forward_path() has two race conditions:
1. The ppp->channels list can change between list_empty() and
list_first_entry(), as ppp_lock() is not held. If the only channel
is deleted in ppp_disconnect_channel(), list_first_entry() may
access an empty head or a freed entry, and trigger a panic.
2. pch->chan can be NULL. When ppp_unregister_channel() is called,
pch->chan is set to NULL before pch is removed from ppp->channels.
Fix these by using a lockless RCU approach:
- Use list_first_or_null_rcu() to safely test and access the first list
entry.
- Convert list modifications on ppp->channels to their RCU variants and
add synchronize_net() after removal.
- Check for a NULL pch->chan before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: fix panic due to PSLVERR
When the PSLVERR_RESP_EN parameter is set to 1, the device generates
an error response if an attempt is made to read an empty RBR (Receive
Buffer Register) while the FIFO is enabled.
In serial8250_do_startup(), calling serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR,
UART_LCR_WLEN8) triggers dw8250_check_lcr(), which invokes
dw8250_force_idle() and serial8250_clear_and_reinit_fifos(). The latter
function enables the FIFO via serial_out(p, UART_FCR, p->fcr).
Execution proceeds to the serial_port_in(port, UART_RX).
This satisfies the PSLVERR trigger condition.
When another CPU (e.g., using printk()) is accessing the UART (UART
is busy), the current CPU fails the check (value & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) ==
(lcr & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) in dw8250_check_lcr(), causing it to enter
dw8250_force_idle().
Put serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) under the port->lock
to fix this issue.
Panic backtrace:
[ 0.442336] Oops - unknown exception [#1]
[ 0.442343] epc : dw8250_serial_in32+0x1e/0x4a
[ 0.442351] ra : serial8250_do_startup+0x2c8/0x88e
...
[ 0.442416] console_on_rootfs+0x26/0x70 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - Prevent crash on suspend with iMX8QM / iMX8ULP
Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.
This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.
Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.
Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.
optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.
Fixes the following splat at suspend:
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : readl+0x0/0x18
lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
sp : ffffffc08192ba20
x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
Call trace:
readl+0x0/0x18
caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
state_store+0xb4/0xf8
kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
vfs_write+0x118/0x178
ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
__arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
el0_svc+0x18/0x44
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ivsc: Fix crash at shutdown due to missing mei_cldev_disable() calls
Both the ACE and CSI driver are missing a mei_cldev_disable() call in
their remove() function.
This causes the mei_cl client to stay part of the mei_device->file_list
list even though its memory is freed by mei_cl_bus_dev_release() calling
kfree(cldev->cl).
This leads to a use-after-free when mei_vsc_remove() runs mei_stop()
which first removes all mei bus devices calling mei_ace_remove() and
mei_csi_remove() followed by mei_cl_bus_dev_release() and then calls
mei_cl_all_disconnect() which walks over mei_device->file_list dereferecing
the just freed cldev->cl.
And mei_vsc_remove() it self is run at shutdown because of the
platform_device_unregister(tp->pdev) in vsc_tp_shutdown()
When building a kernel with KASAN this leads to the following KASAN report:
[ 106.634504] ==================================================================
[ 106.634623] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mei_cl_set_disconnected (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:783) mei
[ 106.634683] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88819cb62018 by task systemd-shutdow/1
[ 106.634729]
[ 106.634767] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 106.634770] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 16 9640/09CK4V, BIOS 1.12.0 02/10/2025
[ 106.634773] Call Trace:
[ 106.634777] <TASK>
...
[ 106.634871] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:636)
[ 106.634901] mei_cl_set_disconnected (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:783) mei
[ 106.634921] mei_cl_all_disconnect (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:2165 (discriminator 4)) mei
[ 106.634941] mei_reset (drivers/misc/mei/init.c:163) mei
...
[ 106.635042] mei_stop (drivers/misc/mei/init.c:348) mei
[ 106.635062] mei_vsc_remove (drivers/misc/mei/mei_dev.h:784 drivers/misc/mei/platform-vsc.c:393) mei_vsc
[ 106.635066] platform_remove (drivers/base/platform.c:1424)
Add the missing mei_cldev_disable() calls so that the mei_cl gets removed
from mei_device->file_list before it is freed to fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() do insn->n samples
The `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` function is used as a default handler for
`INSN_READ` instructions for subdevices that have a handler for
`INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_READ`. Similarly, it is used as a default
handler for `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that have a handler
for `INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_WRITE`. It works by emulating the
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instruction handling with a constructed
`INSN_BITS` instruction. However, `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE`
instructions are supposed to be able read or write multiple samples,
indicated by the `insn->n` value, but `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` currently
only handles a single sample. For `INSN_READ`, the comedi core will
copy `insn->n` samples back to user-space. (That triggered KASAN
kernel-infoleak errors when `insn->n` was greater than 1, but that is
being fixed more generally elsewhere in the comedi core.)
Make `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` either handle `insn->n` samples, or return
an error, to conform to the general expectation for `INSN_READ` and
`INSN_WRITE` handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: Fix ESI null pointer dereference
ESI/MSI is a performance optimization feature that provides dedicated
interrupts per MCQ hardware queue. This is optional feature and UFS MCQ
should work with and without ESI feature.
Commit e46a28cea29a ("scsi: ufs: qcom: Remove the MSI descriptor abuse")
brings a regression in ESI (Enhanced System Interrupt) configuration that
causes a null pointer dereference when Platform MSI allocation fails.
The issue occurs in when platform_device_msi_init_and_alloc_irqs() in
ufs_qcom_config_esi() fails (returns -EINVAL) but the current code uses
__free() macro for automatic cleanup free MSI resources that were never
successfully allocated.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
address 0000000000000008
Call trace:
mutex_lock+0xc/0x54 (P)
platform_device_msi_free_irqs_all+0x1c/0x40
ufs_qcom_config_esi+0x1d0/0x220 [ufs_qcom]
ufshcd_config_mcq+0x28/0x104
ufshcd_init+0xa3c/0xf40
ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x504/0x7d4
ufs_qcom_probe+0x20/0x58 [ufs_qcom]
Fix by restructuring the ESI configuration to try MSI allocation first,
before any other resource allocation and instead use explicit cleanup
instead of __free() macro to avoid cleanup of unallocated resources.
Tested on SM8750 platform with MCQ enabled, both with and without
Platform ESI support. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmscan: fix hwpoisoned large folio handling in shrink_folio_list
In shrink_folio_list(), the hwpoisoned folio may be large folio, which
can't be handled by unmap_poisoned_folio(). For THP, try_to_unmap_one()
must be passed with TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD to split huge PMD first and then
retry. Without TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD, we will trigger null-ptr deref of
pvmw.pte. Even we passed TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD, we will trigger a
WARN_ON_ONCE due to the page isn't in swapcache.
Since UCE is rare in real world, and race with reclaimation is more rare,
just skipping the hwpoisoned large folio is enough. memory_failure() will
handle it if the UCE is triggered again.
This happens when memory reclaim for large folio races with
memory_failure(), and will lead to kernel panic. The race is as
follows:
cpu0 cpu1
shrink_folio_list memory_failure
TestSetPageHWPoison
unmap_poisoned_folio
--> trigger BUG_ON due to
unmap_poisoned_folio couldn't
handle large folio
[tujinjiang@huawei.com: add comment to unmap_poisoned_folio()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/ops-common: ignore migration request to invalid nodes
damon_migrate_pages() tries migration even if the target node is invalid.
If users mistakenly make such invalid requests via
DAMOS_MIGRATE_{HOT,COLD} action, the below kernel BUG can happen.
[ 7831.883495] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001f48
[ 7831.884160] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 7831.884681] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 7831.885203] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 7831.885468] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 7831.885852] CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 94202 Comm: kdamond.0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-mm-new-damon+ #93 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 7831.886913] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.el9 04/01/2014
[ 7831.887777] RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof (include/linux/mmzone.h:1724 include/linux/mmzone.h:1750 mm/page_alloc.c:4936 mm/page_alloc.c:5137)
[...]
[ 7831.895953] Call Trace:
[ 7831.896195] <TASK>
[ 7831.896397] __folio_alloc_noprof (mm/page_alloc.c:5183 mm/page_alloc.c:5192)
[ 7831.896787] migrate_pages_batch (mm/migrate.c:1189 mm/migrate.c:1851)
[ 7831.897228] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
[ 7831.897735] migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:2078)
[ 7831.898141] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
[ 7831.898664] damon_migrate_folio_list (mm/damon/ops-common.c:321 mm/damon/ops-common.c:354)
[ 7831.899140] damon_migrate_pages (mm/damon/ops-common.c:405)
[...]
Add a target node validity check in damon_migrate_pages(). The validity
check is stolen from that of do_pages_move(), which is being used for the
move_pages() system call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/buffer: fix use-after-free when call bh_read() helper
There's issue as follows:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9000168f7f8 by task swapper/3/0
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.16.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
print_report+0xb4/0x270
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110
end_bio_bh_io_sync+0x56/0x80
blk_update_request+0x30a/0x720
scsi_end_request+0x51/0x2b0
scsi_io_completion+0xe3/0x480
? scsi_device_unbusy+0x11e/0x160
blk_complete_reqs+0x7b/0x90
handle_softirqs+0xef/0x370
irq_exit_rcu+0xa5/0xd0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90
</IRQ>
Above issue happens when do ntfs3 filesystem mount, issue may happens
as follows:
mount IRQ
ntfs_fill_super
read_cache_page
do_read_cache_folio
filemap_read_folio
mpage_read_folio
do_mpage_readpage
ntfs_get_block_vbo
bh_read
submit_bh
wait_on_buffer(bh);
blk_complete_reqs
scsi_io_completion
scsi_end_request
blk_update_request
end_bio_bh_io_sync
end_buffer_read_sync
__end_buffer_read_notouch
unlock_buffer
wait_on_buffer(bh);--> return will return to caller
put_bh
--> trigger stack-out-of-bounds
In the mpage_read_folio() function, the stack variable 'map_bh' is
passed to ntfs_get_block_vbo(). Once unlock_buffer() unlocks and
wait_on_buffer() returns to continue processing, the stack variable
is likely to be reclaimed. Consequently, during the end_buffer_read_sync()
process, calling put_bh() may result in stack overrun.
If the bh is not allocated on the stack, it belongs to a folio. Freeing
a buffer head which belongs to a folio is done by drop_buffers() which
will fail to free buffers which are still locked. So it is safe to call
put_bh() before __end_buffer_read_notouch(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix use of uninitialized memory in do_insn_ioctl() and do_insnlist_ioctl()
syzbot reports a KMSAN kernel-infoleak in `do_insn_ioctl()`. A kernel
buffer is allocated to hold `insn->n` samples (each of which is an
`unsigned int`). For some instruction types, `insn->n` samples are
copied back to user-space, unless an error code is being returned. The
problem is that not all the instruction handlers that need to return
data to userspace fill in the whole `insn->n` samples, so that there is
an information leak. There is a similar syzbot report for
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, although it does not have a reproducer for it at
the time of writing.
One culprit is `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` which is used as the handler for
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that do not have
a specific handler for that instruction, but do have an `INSN_BITS`
handler. For `INSN_READ` it only fills in at most 1 sample, so if
`insn->n` is greater than 1, the remaining `insn->n - 1` samples copied
to userspace will be uninitialized kernel data.
Another culprit is `vm80xx_ai_insn_read()` in the "vm80xx" driver. It
never returns an error, even if it fails to fill the buffer.
Fix it in `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` by making sure
that uninitialized parts of the allocated buffer are zeroed before
handling each instruction.
Thanks to Arnaud Lecomte for their fix to `do_insn_ioctl()`. That fix
replaced the call to `kmalloc_array()` with `kcalloc()`, but it is not
always necessary to clear the whole buffer. |
