| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: fix out-of-bounds access in tty_driver_lookup_tty()
When specifying an invalid console= device like console=tty3270,
tty_driver_lookup_tty() returns the tty struct without checking
whether index is a valid number.
To reproduce:
qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -nographic -serial mon:stdio \
-kernel ../linux-build-x86/arch/x86/boot/bzImage \
-append "console=ttyS0 console=tty3270"
This crashes with:
[ 0.770599] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000ef
[ 0.771265] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 0.771773] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 0.772609] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 0.774878] RIP: 0010:tty_open+0x268/0x6f0
[ 0.784013] chrdev_open+0xbd/0x230
[ 0.784444] ? cdev_device_add+0x80/0x80
[ 0.784920] do_dentry_open+0x1e0/0x410
[ 0.785389] path_openat+0xca9/0x1050
[ 0.785813] do_filp_open+0xaa/0x150
[ 0.786240] file_open_name+0x133/0x1b0
[ 0.786746] filp_open+0x27/0x50
[ 0.787244] console_on_rootfs+0x14/0x4d
[ 0.787800] kernel_init_freeable+0x1e4/0x20d
[ 0.788383] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.788881] kernel_init+0x11/0x120
[ 0.789356] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Return error for inconsistent extended attributes
ntfs_read_ea is called when we want to read extended attributes. There
are some sanity checks for the validity of the EAs. However, it fails to
return a proper error code for the inconsistent attributes, which might
lead to unpredicted memory accesses after return.
[ 138.916927] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0
[ 138.923876] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800205cfac by task poc/199
[ 138.931132]
[ 138.933016] CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1+ #4
[ 138.938070] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 138.947327] Call Trace:
[ 138.949557] <TASK>
[ 138.951539] dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x67
[ 138.956834] print_report+0x16f/0x4a6
[ 138.960798] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0
[ 138.964437] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200
[ 138.969793] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0
[ 138.973523] kasan_report+0xb8/0x140
[ 138.976740] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0
[ 138.980578] __asan_store4+0x76/0xa0
[ 138.984669] ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0
[ 138.988115] ? __pfx_ntfs_set_ea+0x10/0x10
[ 138.993390] ? kernel_text_address+0xd3/0xe0
[ 138.998270] ? __kernel_text_address+0x16/0x50
[ 139.002121] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3e/0x60
[ 139.005659] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 139.010177] ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0x100
[ 139.013657] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x27/0x80
[ 139.017018] ntfs_setxattr+0x405/0x440
[ 139.022151] ? __pfx_ntfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[ 139.026569] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120
[ 139.030329] ? kasan_save_stack+0x41/0x60
[ 139.033883] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x60
[ 139.037338] ? kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
[ 139.040163] ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
[ 139.043588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0xa0
[ 139.047255] ? __kmalloc_node+0x68/0x150
[ 139.051264] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120
[ 139.055301] ? vmemdup_user+0x2b/0xa0
[ 139.058584] __vfs_setxattr+0x121/0x170
[ 139.062617] ? __pfx___vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[ 139.066282] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x97/0x300
[ 139.070061] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x145/0x170
[ 139.073580] vfs_setxattr+0x137/0x2a0
[ 139.076641] ? __pfx_vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[ 139.080223] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
[ 139.084234] do_setxattr+0xce/0x150
[ 139.087768] setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 139.091250] ? __pfx_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[ 139.094948] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xcb/0x140
[ 139.097838] ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c7/0x330
[ 139.102688] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
[ 139.105985] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x5b/0x190
[ 139.109980] ? putname+0x84/0xa0
[ 139.113886] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 139.117961] ? putname+0x84/0xa0
[ 139.121316] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 139.124427] ? __mnt_want_write+0xae/0x100
[ 139.127836] ? mnt_want_write+0x8f/0x150
[ 139.130954] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 139.133998] ? __pfx_path_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[ 139.137853] ? __pfx_ksys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10
[ 139.141299] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
[ 139.145714] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x6b/0x80
[ 139.150796] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x71/0x90
[ 139.155407] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 139.159035] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 139.163843] RIP: 0033:0x7f108cae4469
[ 139.166481] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[ 139.183764] RSP: 002b:00007fff87588388 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
[ 139.190657] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f108cae4469
[ 139.196586] RDX: 00007fff875883b0 RSI: 00007fff875883d1 RDI: 00007fff875883b6
[ 139.201716] RBP: 00007fff8758c530 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff8758c618
[ 139.207940] R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000004004c0
[ 139.214007] R13: 00007fff8758c610 R14: 0000000000000000 R15
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gvt: fix gvt debugfs destroy
When gvt debug fs is destroyed, need to have a sane check if drm
minor's debugfs root is still available or not, otherwise in case like
device remove through unbinding, drm minor's debugfs directory has
already been removed, then intel_gvt_debugfs_clean() would act upon
dangling pointer like below oops.
i915 0000:00:02.0: Direct firmware load for i915/gvt/vid_0x8086_did_0x1926_rid_0x0a.golden_hw_state failed with error -2
i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Registered
Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Unregistering
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 2486 Comm: gfx-unbind.sh Tainted: G I 6.1.0-rc8+ #15
Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9350/0JXC1H, BIOS 1.13.0 02/10/2020
RIP: 0010:down_write+0x1f/0x90
Code: 1d ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 48 89 fb e8 62 c0 ff ff bf 01 00 00 00 e8 28 5e 31 ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 33 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 bd 01 00 48 89 43 08 bf 01
RSP: 0018:ffff9eb3036ffcc8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000000a0 RCX: ffffff8100000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffa48787a8
RBP: ffff9eb3036ffd30 R08: ffffeb1fc45a0608 R09: ffffeb1fc45a05c0
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff91acc33fa328 R14: ffff91acc033f080 R15: ffff91acced533e0
FS: 00007f6947bba740(0000) GS:ffff91ae36d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 00000001133a2002 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
simple_recursive_removal+0x9f/0x2a0
? start_creating.part.0+0x120/0x120
? _raw_spin_lock+0x13/0x40
debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
intel_gvt_debugfs_clean+0x15/0x30 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_clean_device+0x49/0xe0 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_driver_remove+0x2f/0xb0
i915_driver_remove+0xa4/0xf0
i915_pci_remove+0x1a/0x30
pci_device_remove+0x33/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x1b2/0x230
unbind_store+0xe0/0x110
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11b/0x1f0
vfs_write+0x203/0x3d0
ksys_write+0x63/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f6947cb5190
Code: 40 00 48 8b 15 71 9c 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 80 3d 51 24 0e 00 00 74 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffcbac45a28 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007f6947cb5190
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 0000555e35c866a0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000555e35c866a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000555e358cb97c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 000000000000000d R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000555e358cb8e0
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvmgt
CR2: 00000000000000a0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pv: fix index value of replaced ASCE
The index field of the struct page corresponding to a guest ASCE should
be 0. When replacing the ASCE in s390_replace_asce(), the index of the
new ASCE should also be set to 0.
Having the wrong index might lead to the wrong addresses being passed
around when notifying pte invalidations, and eventually to validity
intercepts (VM crash) if the prefix gets unmapped and the notifier gets
called with the wrong address. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak if ntfs_read_mft failed
Label ATTR_ROOT in ntfs_read_mft() sets is_root = true and
ni->ni_flags |= NI_FLAG_DIR, then next attr will goto label ATTR_ALLOC
and alloc ni->dir.alloc_run. However two states are not always
consistent and can make memory leak.
1) attr_name in ATTR_ROOT does not fit the condition it will set
is_root = true but NI_FLAG_DIR is not set.
2) next attr_name in ATTR_ALLOC fits the condition and alloc
ni->dir.alloc_run
3) in cleanup function ni_clear(), when NI_FLAG_DIR is set, it frees
ni->dir.alloc_run, otherwise it frees ni->file.run
4) because NI_FLAG_DIR is not set in this case, ni->dir.alloc_run is
leaked as kmemleak reported:
unreferenced object 0xffff888003bc5480 (size 64):
backtrace:
[<000000003d42e6b0>] __kmalloc_node+0x4e/0x1c0
[<00000000d8e19b8a>] kvmalloc_node+0x39/0x1f0
[<00000000fc3eb5b8>] run_add_entry+0x18a/0xa40 [ntfs3]
[<0000000011c9f978>] run_unpack+0x75d/0x8e0 [ntfs3]
[<00000000e7cf1819>] run_unpack_ex+0xbc/0x500 [ntfs3]
[<00000000bbf0a43d>] ntfs_iget5+0xb25/0x2dd0 [ntfs3]
[<00000000a6e50693>] ntfs_fill_super+0x218d/0x3580 [ntfs3]
[<00000000b9170608>] get_tree_bdev+0x3fb/0x710
[<000000004833798a>] vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x280
[<000000006e20b8e6>] path_mount+0xf3c/0x1930
[<000000007bf15a5f>] do_mount+0xf3/0x110
...
Fix this by always setting is_root and NI_FLAG_DIR together. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Prevent handling any completions after qp destroy
HW may generate completions that indicates QP is destroyed.
Driver should not be scheduling any more completion handlers
for this QP, after the QP is destroyed. Since CQs are active
during the QP destroy, driver may still schedule completion
handlers. This can cause a race where the destroy_cq and poll_cq
running simultaneously.
Snippet of kernel panic while doing bnxt_re driver load unload in loop.
This indicates a poll after the CQ is freed.
[77786.481636] Call Trace:
[77786.481640] <TASK>
[77786.481644] bnxt_re_poll_cq+0x14a/0x620 [bnxt_re]
[77786.481658] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[77786.481693] __ib_process_cq+0x57/0x190 [ib_core]
[77786.481728] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core]
[77786.481761] process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0
[77786.481768] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
[77786.481785] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481790] kthread+0xe2/0x110
[77786.481794] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481797] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
To avoid this, complete all completion handlers before returning the
destroy QP. If free_cq is called soon after destroy_qp, IB stack
will cancel the CQ work before invoking the destroy_cq verb and
this will prevent any race mentioned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: don't attempt to queue IO under RCU protection
dm looks up the table for IO based on the request type, with an
assumption that if the request is marked REQ_NOWAIT, it's fine to
attempt to submit that IO while under RCU read lock protection. This
is not OK, as REQ_NOWAIT just means that we should not be sleeping
waiting on other IO, it does not mean that we can't potentially
schedule.
A simple test case demonstrates this quite nicely:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct iovec iov;
int fd;
fd = open("/dev/dm-0", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
posix_memalign(&iov.iov_base, 4096, 4096);
iov.iov_len = 4096;
preadv2(fd, &iov, 1, 0, RWF_NOWAIT);
return 0;
}
which will instantly spew:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5580, name: dm-nowait
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 7 PID: 5580 Comm: dm-nowait Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-g39956d2dcd81 #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x11d/0x1b0
__might_resched+0x3c3/0x5e0
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
mempool_alloc+0x1e2/0x390
? mempool_resize+0x7d0/0x7d0
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x868/0x2d40
bio_alloc_bioset+0x417/0x8c0
? bvec_alloc+0x200/0x200
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xb8c/0x2d40
bio_alloc_clone+0x53/0x100
dm_submit_bio+0x27f/0x1a20
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1a0/0x4d0
? dm_dax_direct_access+0x260/0x260
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1cc/0x4d0
__submit_bio+0x239/0x310
? __bio_queue_enter+0x700/0x700
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x40/0x60
? ktime_get+0x285/0x470
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x4d9/0xb80
? should_fail_request+0x80/0x80
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? __bio_add_page+0x143/0x2d0
? iov_iter_revert+0x27/0x360
submit_bio_noacct+0x53e/0x1b30
submit_bio_wait+0x10a/0x230
? submit_bio_wait_endio+0x40/0x40
__blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x4f8/0x780
? blkdev_bio_end_io+0x4c0/0x4c0
? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xc0
? __bio_clone+0x3c0/0x3c0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? atime_needs_update+0x3bf/0x7e0
? timestamp_truncate+0x21b/0x2d0
? inode_owner_or_capable+0x240/0x240
blkdev_direct_IO.part.0+0x84a/0x1810
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blkdev_read_iter+0x40d/0x530
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0
? __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x780/0x780
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? __mark_inode_dirty+0x297/0xd50
? preempt_count_add+0x72/0x140
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a4/0x530
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2f2/0x3c0
? generic_copy_file_range+0x1d0/0x1d0
? fsnotify_perm.part.0+0x25d/0x630
? security_file_permission+0xd8/0x100
do_iter_read+0x31b/0x880
? import_iovec+0x10b/0x140
vfs_readv+0x12d/0x1a0
? vfs_iter_read+0xb0/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
do_preadv+0x1b3/0x260
? do_readv+0x370/0x370
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5af41ad806
Code: 41 54 41 89 fc 55 44 89 c5 53 48 89 cb 48 83 ec 18 80 3d e4 dd 0d 00 00 74 7a 45 89 c1 49 89 ca 45 31 c0 b8 47 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 be 00 00 00 48 85 c0 79 4a 48 8b 0d da 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3145c7f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000147
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5af41ad806
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffd3145c850 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007ffd3145c850 R14: 000055f5f0431dd8 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
where in fact it is
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390/diag: fix racy access of physical cpu number in diag 9c handler
We do check for target CPU == -1, but this might change at the time we
are going to use it. Hold the physical target CPU in a local variable to
avoid out-of-bound accesses to the cpu arrays. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices
WED is supported just for mmio devices, so do not check it for usb or
sdio devices. This patch fixes the crash reported below:
[ 21.946627] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d
[ 22.525298] wlp0s3u1i3: send auth to c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[ 22.548274] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d
[ 22.557694] wlp0s3u1i3: send auth to c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[ 22.565885] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticated
[ 22.569502] wlp0s3u1i3: associate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[ 22.578966] wlp0s3u1i3: RX AssocResp from c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (capab=0x11 status=30 aid=3)
[ 22.579113] wlp0s3u1i3: c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d rejected association temporarily; comeback duration 1000 TU (1024 ms)
[ 23.649518] wlp0s3u1i3: associate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 2/3)
[ 23.752528] wlp0s3u1i3: RX AssocResp from c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (capab=0x11 status=0 aid=3)
[ 23.797450] wlp0s3u1i3: associated
[ 24.959527] kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[ 24.959640] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88800c223200
[ 24.959706] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 24.959788] #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
[ 24.959846] PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 2c02067 PMD c2a8063 PTE 800000000c223163
[ 24.959957] Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 24.960009] CPU: 0 PID: 391 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 6.2.0-kvm #18
[ 24.960089] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
[ 24.960191] RIP: 0010:0xffff88800c223200
[ 24.960446] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ff7698 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 24.960513] RAX: ffff888028397010 RBX: ffff88800c26e630 RCX: 0000000000000058
[ 24.960598] RDX: ffff88800c26f844 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff888028397010
[ 24.960682] RBP: ffff88800ea72f00 R08: 18b873fbab2b964c R09: be06b38235f3c63c
[ 24.960766] R10: 18b873fbab2b964c R11: be06b38235f3c63c R12: 0000000000000001
[ 24.960853] R13: ffff88800c26f84c R14: ffff8880063f0ff8 R15: ffff88800c26e644
[ 24.960950] FS: 00007effcea327c0(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 24.961036] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 24.961106] CR2: ffff88800c223200 CR3: 000000000eaa2000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 24.961190] Call Trace:
[ 24.961219] <TASK>
[ 24.961245] ? mt76_connac_mcu_add_key+0x2cf/0x310
[ 24.961313] ? mt7921_set_key+0x150/0x200
[ 24.961365] ? drv_set_key+0xa9/0x1b0
[ 24.961418] ? ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0xd9/0x240
[ 24.961485] ? ieee80211_key_replace+0x3f3/0x730
[ 24.961541] ? crypto_shash_setkey+0x89/0xd0
[ 24.961597] ? ieee80211_key_link+0x2d7/0x3a0
[ 24.961664] ? crypto_aead_setauthsize+0x31/0x50
[ 24.961730] ? sta_info_hash_lookup+0xa6/0xf0
[ 24.961785] ? ieee80211_add_key+0x1fc/0x250
[ 24.961842] ? rdev_add_key+0x41/0x140
[ 24.961882] ? nl80211_parse_key+0x6c/0x2f0
[ 24.961940] ? nl80211_new_key+0x24a/0x290
[ 24.961984] ? genl_rcv_msg+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 24.962036] ? rdev_mod_link_station+0xe0/0xe0
[ 24.962102] ? nl80211_set_key+0x410/0x410
[ 24.962143] ? nl80211_pre_doit+0x200/0x200
[ 24.962187] ? genl_bind+0xc0/0xc0
[ 24.962217] ? netlink_rcv_skb+0xaa/0xd0
[ 24.962259] ? genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[ 24.962300] ? netlink_unicast+0x224/0x2f0
[ 24.962345] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x30b/0x3d0
[ 24.962388] ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x109/0x1b0
[ 24.962388] ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x109/0x1b0
[ 24.962440] ? __import_iovec+0x2e/0x110
[ 24.962482] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0xe0
[ 24.962525] ? mod_objcg_state+0x25c/0x330
[ 24.962576] ? __dentry_kill+0x19e/0x1d0
[ 24.962618] ? call_rcu+0x18f/0x270
[ 24.962660] ? __dentry_kill+0x19e/0x1d0
[ 24.962702] ? __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x70/0x90
[ 24.962744] ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[ 24.962796] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1b/0x70
[ 24.962852] ? entry_SYSCA
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/IPoIB: Fix legacy IPoIB due to wrong number of queues
The cited commit creates child PKEY interfaces over netlink will
multiple tx and rx queues, but some devices doesn't support more than 1
tx and 1 rx queues. This causes to a crash when traffic is sent over the
PKEY interface due to the parent having a single queue but the child
having multiple queues.
This patch fixes the number of queues to 1 for legacy IPoIB at the
earliest possible point in time.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000036b
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 209665 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.1.0_for_upstream_min_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0xcb/0x450
Code: ce 7e 49 8b 50 08 49 83 78 10 00 4d 8b 28 0f 84 cb 02 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f 84 c2 02 00 00 41 8b 44 24 28 48 8d 4a
01 49 8b 3c 24 <49> 8b 5c 05 00 4c 89 e8 65 48 0f c7 0f 0f 94 c0 84 c0 74 b8 41 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88822acbbab8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: ffff8881c28e3e00 RCX: 00000000064f8dae
RDX: 00000000064f8dad RSI: 0000000000000a20 RDI: 0000000000030d00
RBP: 0000000000000a20 R08: ffff8882f5d30d00 R09: ffff888104032f40
R10: ffff88810fade828 R11: 736f6d6570736575 R12: ffff88810081c000
R13: 00000000000002fb R14: ffffffff817fc865 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f9324ff9700(0000) GS:ffff8882f5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000036b CR3: 00000001125af004 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_clone+0x55/0xd0
ip6_finish_output2+0x3fe/0x690
ip6_finish_output+0xfa/0x310
ip6_send_skb+0x1e/0x60
udp_v6_send_skb+0x1e5/0x420
udpv6_sendmsg+0xb3c/0xe60
? ip_mc_finish_output+0x180/0x180
? __switch_to_asm+0x3a/0x60
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x60
sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
__sys_sendto+0x103/0x160
? _copy_to_user+0x21/0x30
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10
? ktime_get_ts64+0x49/0xe0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x25/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f9374f1ed14
Code: 42 41 f8 ff 44 8b 4c 24 2c 4c 8b 44 24 20 89 c5 44 8b 54 24 28 48 8b 54 24 18 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 10 8b
7c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 34 89 ef 48 89 44 24 08 e8 68 41 f8 ff 48 8b
RSP: 002b:00007f9324ff7bd0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9324ff7cc8 RCX: 00007f9374f1ed14
RDX: 00000000000002fb RSI: 00007f93000052f0 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007f9324ff7d40 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000012a05f200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f9374d57bdc
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a6xx: Fix kvzalloc vs state_kcalloc usage
adreno_show_object() is a trap! It will re-allocate the pointer it is
passed on first call, when the data is ascii85 encoded, using kvmalloc/
kvfree(). Which means the data *passed* to it must be kvmalloc'd, ie.
we cannot use the state_kcalloc() helper.
This partially reverts commit ec8f1813bf8d ("drm/msm/a6xx: Replace
kcalloc() with kvzalloc()"), but adds the missing kvfree() to fix the
memory leak that was present previously. And adds a warning comment.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/507014/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix possible use-after-free in async command interface
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx should return only after all its callback
handlers were completed. Before this patch, the below race between
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx and mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler was possible and
lead to a use-after-free:
1. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx is called while num_inflight is 2 (i.e.
elevated by 1, a single inflight callback).
2. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx decreases num_inflight to 1.
3. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler is called, decreases num_inflight to 0 and
is about to call wake_up().
4. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx calls wait_event, which returns
immediately as the condition (num_inflight == 0) holds.
5. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx returns.
6. The caller of mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx frees the mlx5_async_ctx
object.
7. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler goes on and calls wake_up() on the freed
object.
Fix it by syncing using a completion object. Mark it completed when
num_inflight reaches 0.
Trace:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888139cd12f4 by task swapper/5/0
CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
print_report.cold+0x2d5/0x684
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
kasan_report+0xb1/0x1a0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
? __delete_object+0xb8/0x100
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x60
? __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
__wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
? __wake_up_common+0x650/0x650
? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
? kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
? kfree+0x1ba/0x520
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220
mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler+0x136/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_comp_handler+0x65a/0x12b0 [mlx5_core]
? dump_command+0xcc0/0xcc0 [mlx5_core]
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
mlx5_eq_async_int+0x3ce/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
? irq_release+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core]
irq_int_handler+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1f2/0x620
handle_irq_event+0xb2/0x1d0
handle_edge_irq+0x21e/0xb00
__common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0
common_interrupt+0x78/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60
Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 eb 47 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d e0 9f 48 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 80 08 7f 85 e8 d1 d3 3e fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfdf0 EFLAGS: 00000242
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ecbd48 RCX: 1ffffffff0afe110
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835cc9bc
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88881dec4ac3
R10: ffffed1103bd8958 R11: 0000017d0ca571c9 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: ffffffff84f024e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x450
default_idle_call+0xec/0x450
do_idle+0x394/0x450
? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40
? do_idle+0x17/0x450
cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
start_secondary+0x221/0x2b0
? set_cpu_sibling_map+0x2070/0x2070
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb
</TASK>
Allocated by task 49502:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
kvmalloc_node+0x48/0xe0
mlx5e_bulk_async_init+0x35/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x84/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1c
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure
On error situation `clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt` should not be given
a reference to the xprt otherwise both client cleanup and the
error handling path of the caller call to put it. Better to
delay handing over the reference to a later branch.
[ 72.530665] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 72.531933] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 173 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[ 72.533075] Modules linked in: nfsd(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfsv3(OE) nfs(OE) lockd(OE) compat_nfs_ssc(OE) nfs_acl(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(OE) auth_rpcgss(OE) rpcrdma(OE) dns_resolver fscache netfs grace rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm sunrpc(OE) mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf ib_uverbs ib_core xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nft_counter xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter bridge stp llc nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set overlay nf_tables nfnetlink crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xfs serio_raw virtio_net virtio_blk net_failover failover fuse [last unloaded: sunrpc]
[ 72.540389] CPU: 0 PID: 173 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G OE 5.15.82-dan #1
[ 72.541511] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+1084+97b81f61 04/01/2014
[ 72.542717] Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_run_cb_work [nfsd]
[ 72.543575] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[ 72.544299] Code: 55 00 0f 0b 5d e9 01 50 98 00 80 3d 75 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 e8 d1 60 8e c6 05 61 9e 39 08 01 e8 f6 51 55 00 <0f> 0b 5d e9 d9 4f 98 00 80 3d 4b 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 4c ff ff ff 48
[ 72.546666] RSP: 0018:ffffb3f841157cf0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 72.547393] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff89ac6231d478 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 72.548324] RDX: ffff89adb7c2c2c0 RSI: ffff89adb7c205c0 RDI: ffff89adb7c205c0
[ 72.549271] RBP: ffffb3f841157cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffefffff
[ 72.550209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb3f841157ad0 R12: ffff89ac6231d180
[ 72.551142] R13: ffff89ac6231d478 R14: ffff89ac40c06180 R15: ffff89ac6231d4b0
[ 72.552089] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89adb7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 72.553175] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 72.553934] CR2: 0000563a310506a8 CR3: 0000000109a66000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 72.554874] Call Trace:
[ 72.555278] <TASK>
[ 72.555614] svc_xprt_put+0xaf/0xe0 [sunrpc]
[ 72.556276] nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.11+0xb7/0x410 [nfsd]
[ 72.557087] ? update_load_avg+0x82/0x610
[ 72.557652] ? cpuacct_charge+0x60/0x70
[ 72.558212] ? dequeue_entity+0xdb/0x3e0
[ 72.558765] ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x20
[ 72.559358] nfsd4_run_cb_work+0xfc/0x270 [nfsd]
[ 72.560031] process_one_work+0x1df/0x390
[ 72.560600] worker_thread+0x37/0x3b0
[ 72.561644] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 72.562247] kthread+0x12f/0x150
[ 72.562710] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[ 72.563309] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 72.563818] </TASK>
[ 72.564189] ---[ end trace 031117b1c72ec616 ]---
[ 72.566019] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff89ac4977e538), but was ffff89ac4763e018. (next=ffff89ac4763e018).
[ 72.567647] ------------[ cut here ]------------ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: dlm: fix race in lowcomms
This patch fixes a race between queue_work() in
_dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() and srcu_read_unlock(). The queue_work() can
take the final reference of a dlm_msg and so msg->idx can contain
garbage which is signaled by the following warning:
[ 676.237050] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 676.237052] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1060 at include/linux/srcu.h:189 dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50
[ 676.238945] Modules linked in: dlm_locktorture torture rpcsec_gss_krb5 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support qxl kvm_intel drm_ttm_helper vmw_vsock_virtio_transport kvm vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common ttm irqbypass crc32_pclmul joydev crc32c_intel serio_raw drm_kms_helper vsock virtio_scsi virtio_console virtio_balloon snd_pcm drm syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt snd_timer fb_sys_fops i2c_i801 lpc_ich snd i2c_smbus soundcore pcspkr
[ 676.244227] CPU: 0 PID: 1060 Comm: lock_torture_wr Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3+ #1546
[ 676.245216] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-2.module+el8.7.0+15506+033991b0 04/01/2014
[ 676.246460] RIP: 0010:dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50
[ 676.247132] Code: fe ff ff ff 75 24 48 c7 c6 bd 0f 49 bb 48 c7 c7 38 7c 01 bd e8 00 e7 ca ff 89 de 48 c7 c7 60 78 01 bd e8 42 3d cd ff 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b eb d8 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48
[ 676.249253] RSP: 0018:ffffa401c18ffc68 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 676.249855] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000ffff8b76 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 676.250713] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffbccf3a10 RDI: ffffffffbcc7b62e
[ 676.251610] RBP: ffffa401c18ffc70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 676.252481] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005
[ 676.253421] R13: ffff8b76786ec370 R14: ffff8b76786ec370 R15: ffff8b76786ec480
[ 676.254257] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8b7777800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 676.255239] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 676.255897] CR2: 00005590205d88b8 CR3: 000000017656c003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 676.256734] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 676.257567] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 676.258397] PKRU: 55555554
[ 676.258729] Call Trace:
[ 676.259063] <TASK>
[ 676.259354] dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0xcc/0x110
[ 676.259964] queue_bast+0x8b/0xb0
[ 676.260423] grant_pending_locks+0x166/0x1b0
[ 676.261007] _unlock_lock+0x75/0x90
[ 676.261469] unlock_lock.isra.57+0x62/0xa0
[ 676.262009] dlm_unlock+0x21e/0x330
[ 676.262457] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.263183] torture_unlock+0x5a/0x90 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.263815] ? preempt_count_sub+0xba/0x100
[ 676.264361] ? complete+0x1d/0x60
[ 676.264777] lock_torture_writer+0xb8/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.265555] kthread+0x10a/0x130
[ 676.266007] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 676.266616] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 676.267097] </TASK>
[ 676.267381] irq event stamp: 9579855
[ 676.267824] hardirqs last enabled at (9579863): [<ffffffffbb14e6f8>] __up_console_sem+0x58/0x60
[ 676.268896] hardirqs last disabled at (9579872): [<ffffffffbb14e6dd>] __up_console_sem+0x3d/0x60
[ 676.270008] softirqs last enabled at (9579798): [<ffffffffbc200349>] __do_softirq+0x349/0x4c7
[ 676.271438] softirqs last disabled at (9579897): [<ffffffffbb0d54c0>] irq_exit_rcu+0xb0/0xf0
[ 676.272796] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
I reproduced this warning with dlm_locktorture test which is currently
not upstream. However this patch fix the issue by make a additional
refcount between dlm_lowcomms_new_msg() and dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg().
In case of the race the kref_put() in dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() will be
the final put. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/xen: Initialize Xen timer only once
Add a check for existing xen timers before initializing a new one.
Currently kvm_xen_init_timer() is called on every
KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_TIMER, which is causing the following ODEBUG
crash when vcpu->arch.xen.timer is already set.
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0)
object type: hrtimer hint: xen_timer_callbac0
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:502
Call Trace:
__debug_object_init
debug_hrtimer_init
debug_init
hrtimer_init
kvm_xen_init_timer
kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl
kvm_vcpu_ioctl
vfs_ioctl |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors
Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which
is based on a customized syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489
CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0
? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197
? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200
? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70
bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640
? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0
bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220
? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120
? __might_fault+0x147/0x180
__sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070
? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530
? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600
? __fget_files+0x255/0x450
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? fput+0x30/0x1a0
? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d
The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1) has
limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the
set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the
actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg->var_off) check may
yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in
00XX -> v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here
represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is
known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg->var_off.value for the
upper index check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache locks in dedicated helper
Move the gfn_to_pfn_cache lock initialization to another helper and
call the new helper during VM/vCPU creation. There are race
conditions possible due to kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init()'s
ability to re-initialize the cache's locks.
For example: a race between ioctl(KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND) and
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init() leads to a corrupted shinfo gpc lock.
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
|
kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast |
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, ...) |
| kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init
| rwlock_init(&gpc->lock)
read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, ...) |
Rename "cache_init" and "cache_destroy" to activate+deactivate to
avoid implying that the cache really is destroyed/freed.
Note, there more races in the newly named kvm_gpc_activate() that will
be addressed separately.
[sean: call out that this is a bug fix] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D bits
Use the recently introduced __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D
bits instead of mapping the PTE into kernel address space. The VM_PFNMAP
path is broken as it assumes that vm_pgoff is the base pfn of the mapped
VMA range, which is conceptually wrong as vm_pgoff is the offset relative
to the file and has nothing to do with the pfn. The horrific hack worked
for the original use case (backing guest memory with /dev/mem), but leads
to accessing "random" pfns for pretty much any other VM_PFNMAP case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
Set the starting uABI size of KVM's guest FPU to 'struct kvm_xsave',
i.e. to KVM's historical uABI size. When saving FPU state for usersapce,
KVM (well, now the FPU) sets the FP+SSE bits in the XSAVE header even if
the host doesn't support XSAVE. Setting the XSAVE header allows the VM
to be migrated to a host that does support XSAVE without the new host
having to handle FPU state that may or may not be compatible with XSAVE.
Setting the uABI size to the host's default size results in out-of-bounds
writes (setting the FP+SSE bits) and data corruption (that is thankfully
caught by KASAN) when running on hosts without XSAVE, e.g. on Core2 CPUs.
WARN if the default size is larger than KVM's historical uABI size; all
features that can push the FPU size beyond the historical size must be
opt-in.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011e33a00 by task qemu-build/681
CPU: 1 PID: 681 Comm: qemu-build Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-KASAN-amd64 #1
Hardware name: /DG35EC, BIOS ECG3510M.86A.0118.2010.0113.1426 01/13/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x45
print_report.cold+0x45/0x575
kasan_report+0x9b/0xd0
fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x72a/0x1c50 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x47f/0x7b0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x5de/0xc90
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
Allocated by task 0:
(stack is not available)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888011e33800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
512-byte region [ffff888011e33800, ffff888011e33a00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000089cd4adb refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11e30
head:0000000089cd4adb order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1)
raw: 4000000000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888001041c80
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888011e33900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888011e33980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888011e33a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888011e33a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888011e33b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: fix panic on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger
crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds:
crash> bt
PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8"
#0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397
#1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d
#2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d
#3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d
#4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9
#5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51
#6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace
[exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227]
RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8
RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200
R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm]
#8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm]
#9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm]
RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b
RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0
R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b0677fc61 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on
out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix
this. |
