| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
r8169: fix LED-related deadlock on module removal
Binding devm_led_classdev_register() to the netdev is problematic
because on module removal we get a RTNL-related deadlock. Fix this
by avoiding the device-managed LED functions.
Note: We can safely call led_classdev_unregister() for a LED even
if registering it failed, because led_classdev_unregister() detects
this and is a no-op in this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled
aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function,
which waits for the work to end if it has already started.
However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will
try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired.
The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state
is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since
disabling aRFS deletes the rules.
Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is
enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.
Kernel log:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I
------------------------------------------------------
ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90
arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0
kthread+0xd7/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270
netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x113/0x170
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by ethtool/386089:
#0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
#1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240
#2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x144/0x160
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? save_trace+0x3e/0x360
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80
? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
? ethn
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion
When the mirred action is used on a classful egress qdisc and a packet is
mirrored or redirected to self we hit a qdisc lock deadlock.
See trace below.
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] ============================================
[ 82.890906] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 82.890906] 6.8.0-05205-g77fadd89fe2d-dirty #213 Tainted: G W
[ 82.890906] --------------------------------------------
[ 82.890906] ping/418 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 82.890906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] CPU0
[ 82.890906] ----
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 82.890906]
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
Example setup (eth0->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
Another example(eth0->eth1->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth1
tc qdisc add dev eth1 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth1 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
We fix this by adding an owner field (CPU id) to struct Qdisc set after
root qdisc is entered. When the softirq enters it a second time, if the
qdisc owner is the same CPU, the packet is dropped to break the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree for clk_summary
Similar to the previous commit, we should make sure that all devices are
runtime resumed before printing the clk_summary through debugfs. Failure
to do so would result in a deadlock if the thread is resuming a device
to print clk state and that device is also runtime resuming in another
thread, e.g the screen is turning on and the display driver is starting
up. We remove the calls to clk_pm_runtime_{get,put}() in this path
because they're superfluous now that we know the devices are runtime
resumed. This also squashes a bug where the return value of
clk_pm_runtime_get() wasn't checked, leading to an RPM count underflow
on error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: mediatek: Do a runtime PM get on controllers during probe
mt8183-mfgcfg has a mutual dependency with genpd during the probing
stage, which leads to a deadlock in the following call stack:
CPU0: genpd_lock --> clk_prepare_lock
genpd_power_off_work_fn()
genpd_lock()
generic_pm_domain::power_off()
clk_unprepare()
clk_prepare_lock()
CPU1: clk_prepare_lock --> genpd_lock
clk_register()
__clk_core_init()
clk_prepare_lock()
clk_pm_runtime_get()
genpd_lock()
Do a runtime PM get at the probe function to make sure clk_register()
won't acquire the genpd lock. Instead of only modifying mt8183-mfgcfg,
do this on all mediatek clock controller probings because we don't
believe this would cause any regression.
Verified on MT8183 and MT8192 Chromebooks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770
page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0
__cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0
_cpu_up+0xeb/0x210
cpu_up+0x91/0xe0
cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0
bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0
smp_init+0x25/0xa0
kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0
kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by bash/46904:
#0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
#1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
#2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
#3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70
#4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
stack backtrace:
CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x129/0x140
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887
Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00
In short, below scene breaks the
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-raid456, md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with reshape
For raid456, if reshape is still in progress, then IO across reshape
position will wait for reshape to make progress. However, for dm-raid,
in following cases reshape will never make progress hence IO will hang:
1) the array is read-only;
2) MD_RECOVERY_WAIT is set;
3) MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set;
After commit c467e97f079f ("md/raid6: use valid sector values to determine
if an I/O should wait on the reshape") fix the problem that IO across
reshape position doesn't wait for reshape, the dm-raid test
shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang:
[root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/979/stack
[<0>] wait_woken+0x7d/0x90
[<0>] raid5_make_request+0x929/0x1d70 [raid456]
[<0>] md_handle_request+0xc2/0x3b0 [md_mod]
[<0>] raid_map+0x2c/0x50 [dm_raid]
[<0>] __map_bio+0x251/0x380 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_submit_bio+0x1f0/0x760 [dm_mod]
[<0>] __submit_bio+0xc2/0x1c0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x17f/0x450
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct+0x2bc/0x780
[<0>] submit_bio+0x70/0xc0
[<0>] mpage_readahead+0x169/0x1f0
[<0>] blkdev_readahead+0x18/0x30
[<0>] read_pages+0x7c/0x3b0
[<0>] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ab/0x280
[<0>] force_page_cache_ra+0x9e/0x130
[<0>] page_cache_sync_ra+0x3b/0x110
[<0>] filemap_get_pages+0x143/0xa30
[<0>] filemap_read+0xdc/0x4b0
[<0>] blkdev_read_iter+0x75/0x200
[<0>] vfs_read+0x272/0x460
[<0>] ksys_read+0x7a/0x170
[<0>] __x64_sys_read+0x1c/0x30
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
This is because reshape can't make progress.
For md/raid, the problem doesn't exist because register new sync_thread
doesn't rely on the IO to be done any more:
1) If array is read-only, it can switch to read-write by ioctl/sysfs;
2) md/raid never set MD_RECOVERY_WAIT;
3) If MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set, mddev_suspend() doesn't hold
'reconfig_mutex', hence it can be cleared and reshape can continue by
sysfs api 'sync_action'.
However, I'm not sure yet how to avoid the problem in dm-raid yet. This
patch on the one hand make sure raid_message() can't change
sync_thread() through raid_message() after presuspend(), on the other
hand detect the above 3 cases before wait for IO do be done in
dm_suspend(), and let dm-raid requeue those IO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Fix deadlock in usb_deauthorize_interface()
Among the attribute file callback routines in
drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c, the interface_authorized_store() function is
the only one which acquires a device lock on an ancestor device: It
calls usb_deauthorize_interface(), which locks the interface's parent
USB device.
The will lead to deadlock if another process already owns that lock
and tries to remove the interface, whether through a configuration
change or because the device has been disconnected. As part of the
removal procedure, device_del() waits for all ongoing sysfs attribute
callbacks to complete. But usb_deauthorize_interface() can't complete
until the device lock has been released, and the lock won't be
released until the removal has finished.
The mechanism provided by sysfs to prevent this kind of deadlock is
to use the sysfs_break_active_protection() function, which tells sysfs
not to wait for the attribute callback.
Reported-and-tested by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Fix deadlock in port "disable" sysfs attribute
The show and store callback routines for the "disable" sysfs attribute
file in port.c acquire the device lock for the port's parent hub
device. This can cause problems if another process has locked the hub
to remove it or change its configuration:
Removing the hub or changing its configuration requires the
hub interface to be removed, which requires the port device
to be removed, and device_del() waits until all outstanding
sysfs attribute callbacks for the ports have returned. The
lock can't be released until then.
But the disable_show() or disable_store() routine can't return
until after it has acquired the lock.
The resulting deadlock can be avoided by calling
sysfs_break_active_protection(). This will cause the sysfs core not
to wait for the attribute's callback routine to return, allowing the
removal to proceed. The disadvantage is that after making this call,
there is no guarantee that the hub structure won't be deallocated at
any moment. To prevent this, we have to acquire a reference to it
first by calling hub_get(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix deadlock between bd_link_disk_holder and partition scan
'open_mutex' of gendisk is used to protect open/close block devices. But
in bd_link_disk_holder(), it is used to protect the creation of symlink
between holding disk and slave bdev, which introduces some issues.
When bd_link_disk_holder() is called, the driver is usually in the process
of initialization/modification and may suspend submitting io. At this
time, any io hold 'open_mutex', such as scanning partitions, can cause
deadlocks. For example, in raid:
T1 T2
bdev_open_by_dev
lock open_mutex [1]
...
efi_partition
...
md_submit_bio
md_ioctl mddev_syspend
-> suspend all io
md_add_new_disk
bind_rdev_to_array
bd_link_disk_holder
try lock open_mutex [2]
md_handle_request
-> wait mddev_resume
T1 scan partition, T2 add a new device to raid. T1 waits for T2 to resume
mddev, but T2 waits for open_mutex held by T1. Deadlock occurs.
Fix it by introducing a local mutex 'blk_holder_mutex' to replace
'open_mutex'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Fix a deadlock issue related to automatic dump
If we issue a disabling PHY command, the device attached with it will go
offline, if a 2 bit ECC error occurs at the same time, a hung task may be
found:
[ 4613.652388] INFO: task kworker/u256:0:165233 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 4613.666297] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.674809] task:kworker/u256:0 state:D stack: 0 pid:165233 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.683959] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_disco_q sas_revalidate_domain [libsas]
[ 4613.691518] Call trace:
[ 4613.694678] __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.698872] __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.703063] schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.706994] schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.711705] __down+0x128/0x36c
[ 4613.715548] down+0x240/0x2d0
[ 4613.719221] hisi_sas_internal_abort_timeout+0x1bc/0x260 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.726618] sas_execute_internal_abort+0x144/0x310 [libsas]
[ 4613.732976] sas_execute_internal_abort_dev+0x44/0x60 [libsas]
[ 4613.739504] hisi_sas_internal_task_abort_dev.isra.0+0xbc/0x1b0 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.747499] hisi_sas_dev_gone+0x174/0x250 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.753682] sas_notify_lldd_dev_gone+0xec/0x2e0 [libsas]
[ 4613.759781] sas_unregister_common_dev+0x4c/0x7a0 [libsas]
[ 4613.765962] sas_destruct_devices+0xb8/0x120 [libsas]
[ 4613.771709] sas_do_revalidate_domain.constprop.0+0x1b8/0x31c [libsas]
[ 4613.778930] sas_revalidate_domain+0x60/0xa4 [libsas]
[ 4613.784716] process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.789424] worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.793878] kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.797810] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 4613.802121] INFO: task kworker/u256:4:316722 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 4613.816026] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.824538] task:kworker/u256:4 state:D stack: 0 pid:316722 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.833670] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0 hisi_sas_rst_work_handler [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.841491] Call trace:
[ 4613.844647] __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.848852] __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.853052] schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.856984] schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.861695] __down+0x128/0x36c
[ 4613.865542] down+0x240/0x2d0
[ 4613.869216] hisi_sas_controller_prereset+0x58/0x1fc [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.876324] hisi_sas_rst_work_handler+0x40/0x8c [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.883019] process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.887732] worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.892204] kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.896118] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 4613.900423] INFO: task kworker/u256:1:348985 blocked for more than 121 seconds.
[ 4613.914341] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.922852] task:kworker/u256:1 state:D stack: 0 pid:348985 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.931984] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_event_q sas_port_event_worker [libsas]
[ 4613.939549] Call trace:
[ 4613.942702] __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.946892] __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.951083] schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.955015] schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.959725] wait_for_common+0x200/0x610
[ 4613.964349] wait_for_completion+0x3c/0x5c
[ 4613.969146] flush_workqueue+0x198/0x790
[ 4613.973776] sas_porte_broadcast_rcvd+0x1e8/0x320 [libsas]
[ 4613.979960] sas_port_event_worker+0x54/0xa0 [libsas]
[ 4613.985708] process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.990420] worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.994868] kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.998800] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
This is because when the device goes offline, we obtain the hisi_hba
semaphore and send the ABORT_DEV command to the device. However, the
internal abort timed out due to the 2 bit ECC error and triggers automatic
dump. In addition, since the hisi_hba semaphore has been obtained, the dump
cannot be executed and the controller cannot be reset.
Therefore, the deadlocks occur on the following circular dependencies
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: cadence-qspi: remove system-wide suspend helper calls from runtime PM hooks
The ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume() callbacks are not
expected to call spi_controller_suspend() and spi_controller_resume().
Remove calls to those in the cadence-qspi driver.
Those helpers have two roles currently:
- They stop/start the queue, including dealing with the kworker.
- They toggle the SPI controller SPI_CONTROLLER_SUSPENDED flag. It
requires acquiring ctlr->bus_lock_mutex.
Step one is irrelevant because cadence-qspi is not queued. Step two
however has two implications:
- A deadlock occurs, because ->runtime_resume() is called in a context
where the lock is already taken (in the ->exec_op() callback, where
the usage count is incremented).
- It would disallow all operations once the device is auto-suspended.
Here is a brief call tree highlighting the mutex deadlock:
spi_mem_exec_op()
...
spi_mem_access_start()
mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
cqspi_exec_mem_op()
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
cqspi_resume()
spi_controller_resume()
mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
...
spi_mem_access_end()
mutex_unlock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fsl-qdma: fix SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read
There is chip (ls1028a) errata:
The SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read transactions by QDMA.
Unaligned read transactions initiated by QDMA may stall in the NOC
(Network On-Chip), causing a deadlock condition. Stalled transactions will
trigger completion timeouts in PCIe controller.
Workaround:
Enable prefetch by setting the source descriptor prefetchable bit
( SD[PF] = 1 ).
Implement this workaround. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix possible deadlock in subflow diag
Syzbot and Eric reported a lockdep splat in the subflow diag:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00212-g40b9385dd8e6 #0 Not tainted
syz-executor.2/24141 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline]
ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137
but task is already holding lock:
ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at:
inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x39f/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1038
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__inet_hash+0x335/0xbe0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:743
inet_csk_listen_start+0x23a/0x320 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1261
__inet_listen_sk+0x2a2/0x770 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:217
inet_listen+0xa3/0x110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:239
rds_tcp_listen_init+0x3fd/0x5a0 net/rds/tcp_listen.c:316
rds_tcp_init_net+0x141/0x320 net/rds/tcp.c:577
ops_init+0x352/0x610 net/core/net_namespace.c:136
__register_pernet_operations net/core/net_namespace.c:1214 [inline]
register_pernet_operations+0x2cb/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:1283
register_pernet_device+0x33/0x80 net/core/net_namespace.c:1370
rds_tcp_init+0x62/0xd0 net/rds/tcp.c:735
do_one_initcall+0x238/0x830 init/main.c:1236
do_initcall_level+0x157/0x210 init/main.c:1298
do_initcalls+0x3f/0x80 init/main.c:1314
kernel_init_freeable+0x42f/0x5d0 init/main.c:1551
kernel_init+0x1d/0x2a0 init/main.c:1441
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
-> #0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
lock_sock_fast include/net/sock.h:1723 [inline]
subflow_get_info+0x166/0xd20 net/mptcp/diag.c:28
tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline]
tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137
inet_sk_diag_fill+0x10ed/0x1e00 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:345
inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x55b/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1061
__inet_diag_dump+0x211/0x3a0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1263
inet_diag_dump_compat+0x1c1/0x2d0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1371
netlink_dump+0x59b/0xc80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
__netlink_dump_start+0x5df/0x790 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x209/0x4c0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1405
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe7/0x410
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
As noted by Eric we can break the lock dependency chain avoid
dumping
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: use the backlog for mirred ingress
The test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 ("act_mirred: use the backlog
for nested calls to mirred ingress") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so
runs, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by
lockdep.
The problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that
if we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)
we may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may
still be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks
is to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path
inline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once
we started to nest mirred calls.
In the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will
lead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current
workaround does not seem to address the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF)
syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix
support of SO_PEEK_OFF.
Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket
sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless
thread safety in the kernel.
After this patch :
- setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock.
- skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock.
- af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(),
because it does not lock u->iolock anymore.
As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean
and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off().
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted
syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
__unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046
____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
-> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360
do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
lock(&u->iolock);
lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
lock(&u->iolock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025:
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0
Hardware name: Google Google C
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpll: fix possible deadlock during netlink dump operation
Recently, I've been hitting following deadlock warning during dpll pin
dump:
[52804.637962] ======================================================
[52804.638536] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[52804.639111] 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #1 Not tainted
[52804.639529] ------------------------------------------------------
[52804.640104] python3/2984 is trying to acquire lock:
[52804.640581] ffff88810e642678 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780
[52804.641417]
but task is already holding lock:
[52804.642010] ffffffff83bde4c8 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20
[52804.642747]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[52804.643551]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[52804.644259]
-> #1 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[52804.644836] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0
[52804.645271] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150
[52804.645723] dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20
[52804.646169] genl_start+0x266/0x320
[52804.646578] __netlink_dump_start+0x321/0x450
[52804.647056] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0
[52804.647575] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0
[52804.648001] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210
[52804.648440] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[52804.648831] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490
[52804.649290] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660
[52804.649742] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0
[52804.650165] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210
[52804.650597] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80
[52804.651045] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[52804.651474] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[52804.652001]
-> #0 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[52804.652650] check_prev_add+0x1ae/0x1280
[52804.653107] __lock_acquire+0x1ed3/0x29a0
[52804.653559] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0
[52804.653984] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150
[52804.654423] netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780
[52804.654845] __netlink_dump_start+0x389/0x450
[52804.655321] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0
[52804.655842] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0
[52804.656272] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210
[52804.656721] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[52804.657119] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490
[52804.657570] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660
[52804.658022] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0
[52804.658450] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210
[52804.658877] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80
[52804.659322] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[52804.659752] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[52804.660281]
other info that might help us debug this:
[52804.661077] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[52804.661671] CPU0 CPU1
[52804.662129] ---- ----
[52804.662577] lock(dpll_lock);
[52804.662924] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC);
[52804.663538] lock(dpll_lock);
[52804.664073] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC);
[52804.664490]
The issue as follows: __netlink_dump_start() calls control->start(cb)
with nlk->cb_mutex held. In control->start(cb) the dpll_lock is taken.
Then nlk->cb_mutex is released and taken again in netlink_dump(), while
dpll_lock still being held. That leads to ABBA deadlock when another
CPU races with the same operation.
Fix this by moving dpll_lock taking into dumpit() callback which ensures
correct lock taking order. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt5645: Fix deadlock in rt5645_jack_detect_work()
There is a path in rt5645_jack_detect_work(), where rt5645->jd_mutex
is left locked forever. That may lead to deadlock
when rt5645_jack_detect_work() is called for the second time.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nouveau: offload fence uevents work to workqueue
This should break the deadlock between the fctx lock and the irq lock.
This offloads the processing off the work from the irq into a workqueue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix hang in nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers()
Syzbot reported a hang issue in migrate_pages_batch() called by mbind()
and nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() called in the log writer of nilfs2.
While migrate_pages_batch() locks a folio and waits for the writeback to
complete, the log writer thread that should bring the writeback to
completion picks up the folio being written back in
nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() that it calls for subsequent log
creation and was trying to lock the folio. Thus causing a deadlock.
In the first place, it is unexpected that folios/pages in the middle of
writeback will be updated and become dirty. Nilfs2 adds a checksum to
verify the validity of the log being written and uses it for recovery at
mount, so data changes during writeback are suppressed. Since this is
broken, an unclean shutdown could potentially cause recovery to fail.
Investigation revealed that the root cause is that the wait for writeback
completion in nilfs_page_mkwrite() is conditional, and if the backing
device does not require stable writes, data may be modified without
waiting.
Fix these issues by making nilfs_page_mkwrite() wait for writeback to
finish regardless of the stable write requirement of the backing device. |
