| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| A vulnerability in the SXP REST API of Cisco ISE could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct SQL injection attacks.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in REST API calls. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted input to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view or modify data on the underlying database for the affected device. In single-node deployments, successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause the affected ISE node to become unavailable, resulting in a DoS condition. In that condition, endpoints that have not already authenticated would be unable to access the network until the node is restored.
To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid administrative credentials, have the SXP service enabled, and have at least one SXP connection configured. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it
When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the
parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the
parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone
lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is
copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for
MGLRU.
The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took
over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it:
folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later
update_lru_size() for those folios goes there.
Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still
walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them.
get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and
the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against
an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the
MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of
NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node
limit just the same.
On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380
counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB,
1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with
CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported
byte-identical sizes.
LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not
spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is
imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by
lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the
parent from here on.
This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as
its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that
invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already
spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec
until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of
memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets
lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in
mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: synopsys: dw-dp: Support unregistering the AUX channel
The DisplayPort AUX channel gets initialized and registered during
dw_dp_bind(), but it is never unregistered, which may lead to resource
leaks and/or use-after-free.
Add the missing dw_dp_unbind() function to allow the users of the
library to handle the required cleanup, i.e. unregister the AUX adapter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Release core resources
Core resources such as the DisplayPort AUX channel get initialized and
registered during dw_dp_bind(), but are never unregistered, which may
lead to memory leaks and/or use-after-free:
[ 224.661371] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662015] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00011aee8550 by task modprobe/658
[ 224.662612]
[ 224.662752] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260305 #14 PREEMPT
[ 224.662759] Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
[ 224.662762] Call trace:
[ 224.662764] show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
[ 224.662772] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x98
[ 224.662777] print_report+0x160/0x4b8
[ 224.662783] kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
[ 224.662790] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
[ 224.662796] device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662802] device_is_dependent+0x108/0x2b0
[ 224.662808] device_link_add+0x1f8/0x10b0
[ 224.662813] devm_of_phy_get_by_index+0x120/0x200
[ 224.662819] dw_dp_bind+0x34c/0xb10 [dw_dp]
[ 224.662830] dw_dp_rockchip_bind+0x194/0x250 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662864] component_bind_all+0x3a8/0x720
[ 224.662869] rockchip_drm_bind+0x120/0x390 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662899] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x76c/0x838
[ 224.662904] component_master_add_with_match+0x1f4/0x230
[ 224.662909] rockchip_drm_platform_probe+0x420/0x538 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662939] platform_probe+0xe8/0x168
[ 224.662945] really_probe+0x340/0x828
[ 224.662950] __driver_probe_device+0x2e0/0x350
[ 224.662954] driver_probe_device+0x80/0x140
[ 224.662959] __driver_attach+0x398/0x460
[ 224.662964] bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x198
[ 224.662968] driver_attach+0x50/0x68
[ 224.662972] bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x4c0
[ 224.662977] driver_register+0x294/0x360
[ 224.662982] __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x98
[ 224.662987] rockchip_drm_init+0xc4/0xff8 [rockchipdrm]
Since a previous commit exported dw_dp_unbind() function in DW DP core
library to take care of the necessary cleanup, use this in the
component's unbind() callback, as well as in its bind() error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup
Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(),
the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a
symmetrical way [1].
Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to
automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv
The smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() function incorrectly checks
the permissions of the 'current' task instead of the
'target' task.
In the msgsnd() syscall path, if a receiver is already waiting,
the pipelined_send() optimization is used to push the message
directly to the receiver task:
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` smp_store_release(&msr->r_msg, msg)
In this case, the 'sender' (current) task performs the check
on behalf of the 'receiver' task (msr->r_tsk, passed as the
'target' parameter):
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` security_msg_queue_msgrcv(,, target := msr->r_tsk,,)
However, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() ignores the 'target' and
checks 'current':
smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(…)
` smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE); // current task
'current' MAY satisfy smack_msg_queue_msgrcv r/w requirement,
but 'target' (the receiver task) might NOT;
as a result, an unauthorized receiver gets the message,
violating MAC policy.
Test:
1) create a sysv message queue with label “foo”
2) echo "bar foo r" >/smack/load2
3) msgrcv(,,,0,MSG_NOERROR) in "bar"-labeled task.
The task is waiting for the messages ...
4) msgsnd() from a "foo"-labeled task:
"bar"-labeled task gets the message.
This patch fixes the issue by checking permission on the
'target' task instead of 'current'.
(2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Return error for invalid number of formats
When the number of input or output formats is zero,
sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_src() and sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_asrc()
print an error and jump to the cleanup label. At that point 'ret' is
still 0, because the earlier sof_ipc4_get_audio_fmt() call succeeded, so
the function returns success and the caller never finds out that the
widget setup actually failed.
Set ret to -EINVAL before the goto so the error gets reported. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove
rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only
when rt700->hw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by
rt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a
jack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback()
or rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized.
Do not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work
objects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove
can cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the
codec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by
manual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The
remove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not
on a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued.
A QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and
then entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object
associated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel.
This is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire
core remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot
run after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this
is a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current
systems. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/lima: call drm_mm_init() with a valid allocation range
lima_vm_create() is currently run before va_start and va_end are set up,
meaning they are both 0. lima_vm_create() runs drm_mm_init() with them
as arguments for the allocator, and if DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled the
DRM_MM_BUG_ON check in drm_mm_init then fires, as seen here on
exynos4412-odroid-u2:
[ 1.736297] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1.740370] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mm.c:931!
[ 1.745574] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
[ 1.750697] Modules linked in:
[ 1.753734] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 41 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 7.0.10-postmarketos-exynos4 #11 PREEMPT
[ 1.763372] Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree)
[ 1.769446] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 1.775261] PC is at drm_mm_init+0x9c/0xa4
[ 1.779339] LR is at lima_vm_create+0x144/0x17c
[ ... ]
Fix the issue by moving the lima_vm_create() call after va_start and
va_end are set up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix uncore_box ref/unref ordering
In uncore_event_cpu_online(), uncore_box_ref() was called before
uncore_change_context(). uncore_box_ref() gates on box->cpu >= 0,
but box->cpu is still -1 at that point because uncore_change_context()
has not run yet. As a result, the box is never initialized on the
first CPU to come online in a die, leaving it permanently
uninitialized in the single-CPU-per-die case.
Thus, box->refcnt is one count below the true value, and in the CPU
offline path, the box will be torn down on the second-to-last CPU.
In uncore_event_cpu_offline(), uncore_box_unref() was called after
uncore_change_context(), so box->cpu is already -1 when the collector
CPU goes offline, which prevents it from tearing down the box.
Fix by swapping the call order in both paths so that
uncore_box_{ref,unref}() runs at the point where box->cpu reflects
the correct context.
Move allocate_boxes() out of uncore_box_ref() to enable this
reordering. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/powerplay: fix VoltageObjectInfo zero-stride loop and OOB read
Reject voltage objects whose usSize is smaller than the header or would
advance the cursor past the table end, preventing an infinite loop or
heap OOB read when the VBIOS supplies a malformed VoltageObjectInfo table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mm_init: handle alloc_percpu failure in free_area_init_core_hotplug
We miss a failed allocation check for pgdat->per_cpu_nodestats, which
results in a NULL deref when we offset into the per-cpu area.
Propagate -ENOMEM up the stack and leave per_cpu_nodestats pointing
at boot_nodestats so a later online can retry the allocation.
hotadd_init_pgdat() returns NULL on failure, which __try_online_node()
already maps to -ENOMEM.
On failure nothing needs to be unwound:
- the node is never marked online
- per_cpu_nodestats is left pointing at boot_nodestats
- __add_memory_resource() cleans up pending memblock resources
- later online attempts retry the per_cpu_nodestats allocation |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: lp5860: Fix a potential double-unlock
In lp5860_device_init(), if lp5860_init_dt() fails, an already unlocked
mutex is unlocked another time.
Slightly rework how the lock is taken/released to avoid this potential
double unlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: zynqmp_dma: fix race between runtime PM and device removal
In zynqmp_dma_remove(), runtime PM was disabled only after checking
state and doing a manual suspend. This can race with runtime PM in the
remove/unbind (rmmod) path.
Disable runtime PM first, then suspend only if the device is not already
suspended. To prevent any further runtime PM transitions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
csky: Fix a4/a5 restoration in syscall trace path
The syscall trace path reloads syscall arguments from pt_regs before
calling the syscall handler. On C-SKY ABIv2, the 5th and 6th syscall
arguments are prepared as stack arguments before invoking syscallid.
The current code adjusts sp before loading LSAVE_A4 and LSAVE_A5. Since
those offsets are relative to the original pt_regs base, loading them
after changing sp fetches the wrong slots. As a result, traced syscalls
that use the 5th or 6th argument may receive corrupted arguments.
This is visible with mmap2(), which takes six arguments. A small
PTRACE_SYSCALL reproducer opens a file and maps one page with:
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0)
Before the fix, the traced child fails the mmap and exits with 12.
After the fix, the mapping succeeds and the child exits with 0.
Fix the trace path by loading a4/a5 from pt_regs before changing sp.
Tested on: ck860f, linux-4.19.15, C-SKY abiv2 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10
Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber
redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack
where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp.
Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop
instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the
redzone area before doing the call, like:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call tramp
Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without
changing the flags.
We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions
above and back as suggested by Peterz [2].
Optimize path (int3_update_optimize):
1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe:
cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original
10-byte NOP.
After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the
old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there.
2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement:
cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3]
From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not
executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped.
3) Publish the first LEA byte:
[48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call <uprobe-trampoline>
Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize):
1) Initial optimized state:
48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
Same as 3) above.
2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes:
[cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the
LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5.
3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped
and byte 5 as CALL.
cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any
thread that was already past the first LEA byte.
4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP:
[66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and
displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as
CALL for a thread that was already there.
Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10
instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across
unoptimization/optimization cycles.
Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed
to observe that CALL and not anything else.
Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10:
PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32
NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1)
which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS
attribute in is_prefix_bad function.
Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe
trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel.
The optimized uprobe performance stays the same:
uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s
uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s
uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s
--> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s
uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s
uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s
--> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s
usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s
--> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: core - fix rng list on registration error
hwrng_register(rng) does the following:
1. Checks if rng has name and read methods set
2. Checks if the name already exists
3. Adds rng to global rng_list
4. May try to set rng to current_rng
If step 4 fails, it returns an error. However, it does not remove the
rng from rng_list, causing a dangling reference which can result in
use-after-free if the caller frees rng, since registration failed.
Add a list_del_init() cleanup step. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: keembay - Fix AEAD unregister count in error path
register_aes_algs() registers the AEAD algorithms before registering the
skcipher algorithms. If skcipher registration fails, the function unwinds
the earlier AEAD registration with crypto_engine_unregister_aeads(), but it
passes ARRAY_SIZE(algs), which is the skcipher table size.
Use ARRAY_SIZE(algs_aead) for the AEAD unwind path so the unregister helper
iterates over the same table that was registered. Also clarify the nearby
comment: the crypto registration helpers clean up algorithms registered
within the same call, while this function must still unwind earlier
successful registration steps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: Make nr_deadline_tasks an atomic_t
The nr_deadline_tasks variable in the cpuset structure was introduced by
commit 6c24849f5515 ("sched/cpuset: Keep track of SCHED_DEADLINE task
in cpusets"). It is reported by sashiko [1] that nr_deadline_tasks
can currently be modified by inc_dl_tasks_cs() under rq->lock and
by cpuset_attach() under cpuset_mutex. So if both updates happen
simultaneously, the nr_deadline_tasks variable can be corrupted leading
to incorrect operations down the road.
Fix that by changing its type to atomic_t so that nr_deadline_tasks
are always atomically updated. This fix patch is a low hanging fruit.
It can handle some of the races between a concurrent sched_setscheduler()
and cpuset_can_attach()/cpuset_attach() calls, but not all of them like
the other issue raised by sashiko [2]. This will be handled hopefully
in a future follow up patch.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260626181923.133658-1-longman%40redhat.com
[2] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260630033344.352702-1-longman%40redhat.com |
