| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Do not allow binding to VMADDR_PORT_ANY
It is possible for a vsock to autobind to VMADDR_PORT_ANY. This can
cause a use-after-free when a connection is made to the bound socket.
The socket returned by accept() also has port VMADDR_PORT_ANY but is not
on the list of unbound sockets. Binding it will result in an extra
refcount decrement similar to the one fixed in fcdd2242c023 (vsock: Keep
the binding until socket destruction).
Modify the check in __vsock_bind_connectible() to also prevent binding
to VMADDR_PORT_ANY. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix a race in packet_set_ring() and packet_notifier()
When packet_set_ring() releases po->bind_lock, another thread can
run packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.
This race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076edea7
("net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()").
There too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a
po->bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And
the fix was similarly to temporarily set po->num to zero to keep
the socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.
The po->bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the
introduction of git history. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.
We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).
If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion
Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than
EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links.
Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and
does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't
limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons:
- They don't look upwards in the tree.
- If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of
the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit
28d82dc1c4ed ("epoll: limit paths").
Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just
serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops.
A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph
edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no
paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5
edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files.
As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500,
tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may
have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion
problem").)
To fix it:
1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node,
and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree
has already been visited.
2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum
depth of an upwards walk.
3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length
between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: fbtft: fix potential memory leak in fbtft_framebuffer_alloc()
In the error paths after fb_info structure is successfully allocated,
the memory allocated in fb_deferred_io_init() for info->pagerefs is not
freed. Fix that by adding the cleanup function on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM / devfreq: Check governor before using governor->name
Commit 96ffcdf239de ("PM / devfreq: Remove redundant governor_name from
struct devfreq") removes governor_name and uses governor->name to replace
it. But devfreq->governor may be NULL and directly using
devfreq->governor->name may cause null pointer exception. Move the check of
governor to before using governor->name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl818x: Kill URBs before clearing tx status queue
In rtl8187_stop() move the call of usb_kill_anchored_urbs() before clearing
b_tx_status.queue. This change prevents callbacks from using already freed
skb due to anchor was not killed before freeing such skb.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.15.0 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe+0x21/0xc0 [mac80211]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
rtl8187_tx_cb+0x116/0x150 [rtl8187]
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x9d/0x120
usb_giveback_urb_bh+0xbb/0x140
process_one_work+0x19b/0x3c0
bh_worker+0x1a7/0x210
tasklet_action+0x10/0x30
handle_softirqs+0xf0/0x340
__irq_exit_rcu+0xcd/0xf0
common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
</IRQ>
Tested on RTL8187BvE device.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iwlwifi: Add missing check for alloc_ordered_workqueue
Add check for the return value of alloc_ordered_workqueue since it may
return NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: clear initialized flag for deinit-ed srng lists
In a number of cases we see kernel panics on resume due
to ath11k kernel page fault, which happens under the
following circumstances:
1) First ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call
Last interrupt received for each group:
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 22511ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14440788ms before
[..]
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to receive control response completion, polling..
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: Service connect timeout
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to connect to HTT: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to start core: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: firmware crashed: MHI_CB_EE_RDDM
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: already resetting count 2
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to wait wlan mode request (mode 4): -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: qmi failed to send wlan mode off: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to reconfigure driver on crash recovery
[..]
2) At this point reconfiguration fails (we have 2 resets) and
ath11k_core_reconfigure_on_crash() calls ath11k_hal_srng_deinit()
which destroys srng lists. However, it does not reset per-list
->initialized flag.
3) Second ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call sees stale ->initialized
flag and attempts to dump srng stats:
Last interrupt received for each group:
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 66785ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 2 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 3 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 4 14780845ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 5 14780845ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 6 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 7 66814ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 8 68997ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 9 67588ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 10 69511ms before
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa007404eb010
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10022d067 PMD 100b01067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0xae/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x381/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x69/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]
ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0xbd/0x1050 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]
worker_thread+0x389/0x930
kthread+0x149/0x170
Clear per-list ->initialized flag in ath11k_hal_srng_deinit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: xilinx: vcu: unregister pll_post only if registered correctly
If registration of pll_post is failed, it will be set to NULL or ERR,
unregistering same will fail with following call trace:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 008
pc : clk_hw_unregister+0xc/0x20
lr : clk_hw_unregister_fixed_factor+0x18/0x30
sp : ffff800011923850
...
Call trace:
clk_hw_unregister+0xc/0x20
clk_hw_unregister_fixed_factor+0x18/0x30
xvcu_unregister_clock_provider+0xcc/0xf4 [xlnx_vcu]
xvcu_probe+0x2bc/0x53c [xlnx_vcu] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix crash when rebind ccp device for ccp.ko
When CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DEBUGFS is enabled, rebinding
the ccp device causes the following crash:
$ echo '0000:0a:00.2' > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/unbind
$ echo '0000:0a:00.2' > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/bind
[ 204.976930] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[ 204.978026] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 204.979126] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 204.980226] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 204.981317] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
...
[ 204.997852] Call Trace:
[ 204.999074] <TASK>
[ 205.000297] start_creating+0x9f/0x1c0
[ 205.001533] debugfs_create_dir+0x1f/0x170
[ 205.002769] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 205.004000] ccp5_debugfs_setup+0x87/0x170 [ccp]
[ 205.005241] ccp5_init+0x8b2/0x960 [ccp]
[ 205.006469] ccp_dev_init+0xd4/0x150 [ccp]
[ 205.007709] sp_init+0x5f/0x80 [ccp]
[ 205.008942] sp_pci_probe+0x283/0x2e0 [ccp]
[ 205.010165] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 205.011376] local_pci_probe+0x4f/0xb0
[ 205.012584] pci_device_probe+0xdb/0x230
[ 205.013810] really_probe+0xed/0x380
[ 205.015024] __driver_probe_device+0x7e/0x160
[ 205.016240] device_driver_attach+0x2f/0x60
[ 205.017457] bind_store+0x7c/0xb0
[ 205.018663] drv_attr_store+0x28/0x40
[ 205.019868] sysfs_kf_write+0x5f/0x70
[ 205.021065] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x145/0x1d0
[ 205.022267] vfs_write+0x308/0x440
[ 205.023453] ksys_write+0x6d/0xe0
[ 205.024616] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30
[ 205.025778] x64_sys_call+0x16ba/0x2150
[ 205.026942] do_syscall_64+0x56/0x1e0
[ 205.028108] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 205.029276] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc36f10104
[ 205.030420] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 8d 05 e1 08 2e 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 41 54 55 49 89 d4 53 48 89 f5
This patch sets ccp_debugfs_dir to NULL after destroying it in
ccp5_debugfs_destroy, allowing the directory dentry to be
recreated when rebinding the ccp device.
Tested on AMD Ryzen 7 1700X. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value in extent_info usage
KMSAN reported a use of uninitialized value in `__is_extent_mergeable()`
and `__is_back_mergeable()` via the read extent tree path.
The root cause is that `get_read_extent_info()` only initializes three
fields (`fofs`, `blk`, `len`) of `struct extent_info`, leaving the
remaining fields uninitialized. This leads to undefined behavior
when those fields are accessed later, especially during
extent merging.
Fix it by zero-initializing the `extent_info` struct before population. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid UAF in f2fs_sync_inode_meta()
syzbot reported an UAF issue as below: [1] [2]
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashReport&x=16594c60580000
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100567dc8 by task kworker/u4:0/8
CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller-00017-g642656a36791 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x151/0x1b7 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:316 [inline]
print_report+0x158/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:427
kasan_report+0x13c/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:531
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351
__list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline]
list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline]
f2fs_inode_synced+0x100/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1553
f2fs_update_inode+0x72/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:588
f2fs_update_inode_page+0x135/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:706
f2fs_write_inode+0x416/0x790 fs/f2fs/inode.c:734
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline]
__writeback_single_inode+0x4cf/0xb80 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677
writeback_sb_inodes+0xb32/0x1910 fs/fs-writeback.c:1903
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x118/0x3f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1974
wb_writeback+0x3da/0xa00 fs/fs-writeback.c:2081
wb_check_background_flush fs/fs-writeback.c:2151 [inline]
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2239 [inline]
wb_workfn+0xbba/0x1030 fs/fs-writeback.c:2266
process_one_work+0x73d/0xcb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2299
worker_thread+0xa60/0x1260 kernel/workqueue.c:2446
kthread+0x26d/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:386
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>
Allocated by task 298:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:333
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:202 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3421 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3431 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3438 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x102/0x270 mm/slub.c:3454
alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3255 [inline]
f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x350 fs/f2fs/super.c:1437
alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline]
iget_locked+0x18c/0x7e0 fs/inode.c:1373
f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:486
f2fs_lookup+0x3c1/0xb50 fs/f2fs/namei.c:484
__lookup_slow+0x2b9/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:1689
lookup_slow+0x5a/0x80 fs/namei.c:1706
walk_component+0x2e7/0x410 fs/namei.c:1997
lookup_last fs/namei.c:2454 [inline]
path_lookupat+0x16d/0x450 fs/namei.c:2478
filename_lookup+0x251/0x600 fs/namei.c:2507
vfs_statx+0x107/0x4b0 fs/stat.c:229
vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline]
vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3434 [inline]
__do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline]
__se_sys_newlstat+0xda/0x7c0 fs/stat.c:417
__x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417
x64_sys_call+0x52/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:516
____kasan_slab_free+0x131/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:241
__kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:249
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:178 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1745 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1771 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3686 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_evict_inode
As syzbot [1] reported as below:
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450
R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564
CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88
dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316
print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427
kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351
__list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline]
list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline]
f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531
f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585
f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703
f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline]
__writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677
writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733
sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789
f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159
block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline]
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658
kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668
deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332
deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363
cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186
__cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193
task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline]
do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030
x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2
RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360
R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360
R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520
</TASK>
Allocated by task 569:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429
alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline]
f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419
alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline]
iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373
f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483
f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487
__lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690
lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707
walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug safe
Multiple race conditions existed between the PCIe hotplug driver and the
EEH driver, leading to a variety of kernel oopses of the same general
nature:
<pcie device unplug>
<eeh driver trigger>
<hotplug removal trigger>
<pcie tree reconfiguration>
<eeh recovery next step>
<oops in EEH driver bus iteration loop>
A second class of oops is also seen when the underlying bus disappears
during device recovery.
Refactor the EEH module to be PCI rescan and remove safe. Also clean
up a few minor formatting / readability issues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data
on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might
read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline]
ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314
pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
__release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: reject malicious packets in ipv6_gso_segment()
syzbot was able to craft a packet with very long IPv6 extension headers
leading to an overflow of skb->transport_header.
This 16bit field has a limited range.
Add skb_reset_transport_header_careful() helper and use it
from ipv6_gso_segment()
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5871 Comm: syz-executor211 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g7abc678e3084 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
RIP: 0010:skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53
nsh_gso_segment+0x54a/0xe10 net/nsh/nsh.c:110
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x342/0x510 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x857/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:3950
validate_xmit_skb_list+0x84/0x120 net/core/dev.c:4000
sch_direct_xmit+0xd3/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:329
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4102 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x17b6/0x3a70 net/core/dev.c:4679 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
benet: fix BUG when creating VFs
benet crashes as soon as SRIOV VFs are created:
kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:3457!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 7408 Comm: test.sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[...]
RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x5f/0x70
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__iommu_dma_free+0xe8/0x1c0
be_cmd_set_mac_list+0x3fe/0x640 [be2net]
be_cmd_set_mac+0xaf/0x110 [be2net]
be_vf_eth_addr_config+0x19f/0x330 [be2net]
be_vf_setup+0x4f7/0x990 [be2net]
be_pci_sriov_configure+0x3a1/0x470 [be2net]
sriov_numvfs_store+0x20b/0x380
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x354/0x530
vfs_write+0x9b9/0xf60
ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x3d0
be_cmd_set_mac_list() calls dma_free_coherent() under a spin_lock_bh.
Fix it by freeing only after the lock has been released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail
When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the
event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase
the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as
perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another
reference count leak.
Return early on failure to prevent that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Prevent VMA split of buffer mappings
The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the
ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports
it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use
the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for
the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct.
Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2),
munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls,
which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close()
calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to
reference count leaks.
As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the
initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by
resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented.
Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return
unconditionally -EINVAL.
That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the
fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still
possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of
the old mapping. |
