| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer
fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as
int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count),
is a size_t. The expression
trkcount * rpt_max * sizeof(struct eckd_count)
is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is
silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit
fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range
(start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation
yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually
requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation,
while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the
untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer.
Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a
size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL
instead of a silently truncated allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec
Per-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once
installed, they should not be dropped across exec.
For a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls
__io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task
restriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.
Split task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from
the exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task
cleanup, where both the context and restriction are released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: remove napi_synchronize() in igc_down()
When an AF_XDP zero-copy application is killed abruptly, the XSK pool is
torn down but NAPI keeps polling. igc_clean_rx_irq_zc() then returns the
full budget on every poll, so napi_complete_done() never clears
NAPI_STATE_SCHED.
igc_down() calls napi_synchronize() before napi_disable(), so it spins
forever waiting for that bit and the interface never goes down. Drop the
napi_synchronize() and let napi_disable() do the job -- it sets
NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, which forces the stuck poll to complete. Reorder it
ahead of igc_set_queue_napi() so the NAPI mapping is cleared only after
polling has stopped, matching the recent igb fix b1e067240379. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: add a separate bio_set for iomap_split_ioend
iomap_split_ioend can split bios that already come from
iomap_ioend_bioset and thus deadlock when the bioset is exhausted.
Add a separate bio_set to avoid this deadlock.
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says:
Mark iomap_ioend_split_bioset static as it is only used in ioend.c,
fixing the sparse warning reported by the kernel test robot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of: reserved_mem: prevent OOB when too many dynamic regions are defined
On boot, fdt_scan_reserved_mem() saves each dynamically-placed
/reserved-memory subnode into a local array of size
MAX_RESERVED_REGIONS.
If the device tree defines more than MAX_RESERVED_REGIONS
dynamically-placed regions, fdt_scan_reserved_mem() writes past the
end of the local array.
Add a bounds check that logs an error and skips the excess regions,
restoring the original behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: migrate_device: fix pte_pfn/pte_dirty called on non-present PTE
pte_pfn() and pte_dirty() have undefined behaviour when called on a
non-present PTE. In migrate_vma_collect_pmd(), these functions may be
invoked on non-present entries (e.g., device-private entries), leading
to potential crashes from pte_pfn() or incorrect dirty folio accounting
from pte_dirty(). Fix both by guarding with pte_present() checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/viommu: Release the igroup lock on the vdevice_size error path
iommufd_vdevice_alloc_ioctl() takes idev->igroup->lock, then validates the
driver's vdevice_size against the core structure size with a WARN_ON_ONCE.
On failure that guard jumps to out_put_idev, below out_unlock_igroup, so it
skips the mutex_unlock(), leaving the igroup lock held and deadlocking the
next vDEVICE operation on that group.
Jump to out_unlock_igroup instead. |
| A flaw was found in the Linux kernel in net/can/bcm.c in can: bcm, where an unprivileged local user can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code within the kernel, which leads to a local privilege escalation (LPE). This allows the attacker to gain root privileges and take full control of the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/percpu-km: fix bitmap overflow and accounting in pcpu_create_chunk()
In pcpu_create_chunk(), nr_pages is the total contiguous backing
allocation, i.e., nr_units * pcpu_unit_pages, but pcpu_chunk_populated()
uses it to set chunk->populated, whose size is pcpu_unit_pages, bitmap.
Since bit N in chunk->populated means page offset N inside every unit is
backed. When nr_units > 1, the function writes beyond chunk->populated.
Fix it by using chunk->nr_pages.
It also fixes the global pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages accounting, since
pcpu_balance_free() only iterates up to chunk->nr_pages.
Commit a63d4ac4ab609 ("percpu: make percpu-km set chunk->populated bitmap
properly") introduced the bitmap overflow issue. Later, commit
b539b87fed37f ("percpu: implmeent pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages and
chunk->nr_populated") added pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages and caused the
accounting issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf sched: Fix register_pid() overflow, strcpy, and BUG_ON
register_pid() has several issues when processing untrusted perf.data:
1. Integer overflow: (pid + 1) * sizeof(struct task_desc *) can wrap
to a small value on 32-bit systems when pid is large (e.g.
0x40000000), causing realloc to return a tiny buffer followed by
out-of-bounds writes in the initialization loop.
2. Heap buffer overflow: strcpy(task->comm, comm) copies the
untrusted comm string into a fixed 20-byte COMM_LEN buffer with
no length check.
3. BUG_ON on allocation failure: perf.data is untrusted input, so
allocation failures should be handled gracefully rather than
killing the process.
4. Realloc of sched->tasks assigned directly back, leaking the old
pointer on failure; nr_tasks incremented before the realloc,
leaving corrupted state on failure.
Cap pid at PID_MAX_LIMIT (4194304, matching the kernel's maximum
on 64-bit), replace strcpy with strlcpy, guard against NULL comm,
replace BUG_ON with NULL returns using safe realloc patterns, and
add NULL checks in callers that dereference the result. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid double-unpin of DOORBELL/MMIO BOs on free
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_free_memory_of_gpu() unpinned DOORBELL and MMIO
remap BOs (which are pinned at allocation time) before checking whether
the BO is still mapped to the GPU. When the BO is still mapped, the
function returns -EBUSY and leaves the BO alive, but it has already
been unpinned. The BO is then unpinned again when it is finally freed
during process teardown, triggering a ttm_bo_unpin() underflow warning:
WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 15066 at ttm/ttm_bo.c:650 amdttm_bo_unpin+0x6d/0x80 [amdttm]
Workqueue: kfd_process_wq kfd_process_wq_release [amdgpu]
RIP: 0010:amdttm_bo_unpin+0x6d/0x80 [amdttm]
Call Trace:
amdgpu_bo_unpin+0x1a/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_unpin_bo+0x31/0xb0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_free_memory_of_gpu+0x3bf/0x460 [amdgpu]
kfd_process_free_outstanding_kfd_bos+0xd4/0x170 [amdgpu]
kfd_process_wq_release+0x109/0x1b0 [amdgpu]
process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
kthread+0xdd/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
Move the unpin after the mapped_to_gpu_memory check so it only happens
once we are committed to freeing the BO.
(cherry picked from commit 927c5b2defb9b09856444d94bebfd056a002bd75) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking
al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu
against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted
perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an
out-of-bounds heap read.
Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.
Also bounds-check al->cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the
accessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: use READ_ONCE() for dev->driver in dev_has_sync_state()
dev_has_sync_state() reads dev->driver twice without holding
device_lock() -- once for the NULL check and once to dereference
->sync_state. Some callers only hold device_links_write_lock, which
doesn't prevent a concurrent unbind from clearing dev->driver via
device_unbind_cleanup().
Fix it by reading dev->driver exactly once with READ_ONCE(), pairing
with the WRITE_ONCE() in device_set_driver(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/mm: use physical alignment for vmemmap_start_pfn
RISC-V computes vmemmap_start_pfn by rounding phys_ram_base down to
VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. That alignment must therefore be expressed in the
physical-address domain.
Commit 476849b0fba4 ("riscv/mm: align vmemmap to maximal folio size")
attempted to account for the maximal folio alignment by feeding
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN directly into VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. However,
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN is measured in bytes of struct page storage,
whereas VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN is used to align a physical address.
The mask-based compound_info encoding requires pfn_to_page(0) to be
naturally aligned to MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN. Commit 9f94db4c7eaa
("mm/sparse: check memmap alignment for compound_info_has_mask()") added a
check for that requirement and exposed the unit mismatch on systems such
as QEMU virt, where the DRAM base is not aligned to MAX_FOLIO_NR_PAGES *
PAGE_SIZE.
Here is the log:
[ 0.000000][ C0] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000][ C0] WARNING: mm/sparse.c:365 at sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe, CPU#0: swapper/0
[ 0.000000][ C0] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-g1d8304bdd65f #2 PREEMPT
[ 0.000000][ C0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] ra : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : ffffffff86851c88 ra : ffffffff86851c88 sp : ffffffff88807a30
[ 0.000000][ C0] gp : ffffffff8a3bf240 tp : ffffffff88842080 t0 : ff600000ffab6000
[ 0.000000][ C0] t1 : 000000017fab6000 t2 : 65203a6573726363 s0 : ffffffff88807bc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s1 : 000000000e000000 a0 : 0000000000000007 a1 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff86851c88 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a5 : ffffffff88843080 a6 : 0000000000000003 a7 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s2 : ff60000000000000 s3 : 0040000000000000 s4 : 0004000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s5 : ffffffff8a4d92e0 s6 : ff600000ffab55e0 s7 : ffffffff88384d00
[ 0.000000][ C0] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff88384cc1 s10: ffffffff88384cc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s11: ffffffff8a4daae0 t3 : ffffffff915e8b20 t4 : ffffffff915e8b20
[ 0.000000][ C0] t5 : ffffffff915e8b20 t6 : ffffffff915e8bc8 ssp : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff86851c88 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86851c88>] sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff8683d396>] mm_core_init_early+0x116/0x1e30
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86801edc>] start_kernel+0xd2/0x848
Convert MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN to the equivalent physical alignment
before using it in VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. This keeps the existing
round_down() logic while making the resulting vmemmap base satisfy the
mask-alignment requirement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: pass eth to mtk_handle_irq_rx in poll_controller
mtk_handle_irq_rx expects a struct mtk_eth * (matching the request_irq
cookie), but mtk_poll_controller incorrectly passed the net_device *.
Calling ndo_poll_controller with CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER enabled
would then crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths
vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and
heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:
- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the
offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO
size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the
resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride *
height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow.
- The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The
loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride +
width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride < width_in_bytes),
and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.
The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a
configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported
framebuffer can reach this path.
Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO's size up front
using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk
memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride;
otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom
of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride <
width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in decompress_lznt
decompress_lznt() does not validate array index bounds before accessing
the decompression table. A corrupted NTFS3 image with invalid compressed
data can trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Add index bounds checking to prevent the OOB access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Fix OOB read in hid_get_report for numbered reports
When a caller passes a size of 0 to hid_report_raw_event() for a
numbered report, the function originally called hid_get_report() before
performing any size validation.
Inside hid_get_report(), if the report is numbered (report_enum->numbered
is true), it unconditionally dereferences data[0] to extract the report ID.
With a size of 0, this results in an out-of-bounds read or kernel panic.
Fix this by moving the numbered report size validation check before the
call to hid_get_report(), ensuring that size is at least 1 before
dereferencing the data pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles
The function aa_replace_profiles was accessing udata->size after calling
aa_put_loaddata(udata), causing a potential UAF.
Fixed this by saving the size to a local variable before dropping the
reference. |
