| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Microsoft WDAC OLE DB provider for SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Message Queuing (MSMQ) Denial of Service Vulnerability |
| Microsoft WDAC OLE DB provider for SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft WDAC OLE DB provider for SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Message Queuing (MSMQ) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Microsoft ActiveX Data Objects Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Windows Wireless Wide Area Network Service (WwanSvc) Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Office Visio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Office Visio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| A vulnerability has been found in MZ Automation libiec61850 up to 1.6.1. The affected element is the function MmsMapping_varAccessSpecToObjectReference of the file src/iec61850/common/iec61850_common.c of the component MMS Protocol Workflow. Such manipulation of the argument GetNamedVariableListAttributesResponse.itemId leads to heap-based buffer overflow. The attack must be carried out locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL
check_add_overflow() unconditionally writes the truncated sum into *d
even on overflow, per its contract in include/linux/overflow.h.
The four check_add_overflow() guards in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl()
and set_ntacl_dacl() break out of the ACE-building loops on overflow,
but the truncated *size is then consumed downstream at the end of
set_ntacl_dacl():
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(pndacl->size) + size);
This produces an on-wire NT ACL whose pndacl->size under-reports the
bytes actually written by the preceding fill_ace_for_sid()/memcpy()
calls, yielding a malformed ACL that can trigger out-of-bounds reads
when re-parsed by clients or ksmbd itself.
Restore *size to its pre-addition value on each overflow branch (via
`*size -= ace_sz` / `size -= nt_ace_size`) so that after the break,
*size once again holds the cumulative size of the successfully-written
ACEs. The committed ACL is then truncated-but-self-consistent rather
than malformed.
The ksmbd DACL builders are the only check_add_overflow() sites found
where an overflow path breaks out of a loop and the destination value
is consumed afterward. The other nearby break-style cases either
return -EINVAL on overflow (transport_ipc.c) or break without
consuming the overflowed destination value afterward (buildid.c). |
| GNU cpio is vulnerable to an uncontrolled memory allocation in the make_path function at src/makepath.c. The function uses alloca to allocate stack memory based on the length of argpath, which is derived from an archive-controlled pathname during extraction. A malicious cpio archive containing a sufficiently long nested pathname causes an unbounded stack allocation, resulting in a stack overflow and crash of the cpio process. An attacker who can supply a crafted cpio archive to a victim who extracts it can cause a denial of service.
This issue has been fixed in commit 3cd514031371d8aeeaf2048aa10103e02831aaa9 |
| microtar's mtar_write_file_header and mtar_write_dir_header functions (src/microtar.c) copy a caller-supplied entry name into the 100-byte field of a stack-allocated mtar_header_t via strcpy(h.name, name), with no check that strlen(name) is less than 100 before the copy. |
| tinyobjloader-c's tinyobj_parse_and_index_mtl_file (tinyobj_loader_c.h) reads each line of a .mtl material file into a fixed 4096-byte stack buffer via memcpy(linebuf, p, p_len), guarded only by . The identical vulnerable pattern is duplicated in a second function in the same file. |
| Domoticz's MochadTCP::MatchLine handler for MOCHAD_RFSEC messages (hardware/MochadTCP.cpp) copies network-received data from the up-to-1028-byte m_mochadbuffer into a fixed 50-byte stack buffer tempRFSECbuf using strcpy with no length check, across three separate code branches (DS10A/KR10A/MS10A device types). |
| nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds stack read leading to a wild-pointer write in nmbs_read_device_identification_basic / recv_read_device_identification_res in nanomodbus.c. A fixed 3-element stack array order[3] = {0,1,2} maps object IDs to buffer indices. The server-supplied object_id field (0-255, read directly from the wire) is used without any bounds check as buf_index = order[object_id]. |
| imagecli's pipeline operation (Carve::apply in src/image_ops.rs) only asserts , never validating that the ratio is positive. A negative ratio (e.g. -5) causes the computed target width to saturate to 0 via Rust's defined float-to-uint cast, which is then passed to imageproc::seam_carving::shrink_width — a function that panics when given a width below 2, crashing the process. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the raw_to_header function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0. The function copies the 100-byte name and linkname fields of a TAR header with strcpy without guaranteeing null termination of the source. |
